Missouri Roundup Cancer Lawsuit After the Supreme Court’s FIFRA Preemption Ruling: What Monsanto v. Durnell Means for Your Case
You heard the headline — the Supreme Court sided with Bayer, and now you are sitting at a kitchen table or in a hospital waiting room wondering whether the door just closed on your Roundup case. It did not close all of them. One door closed. Others remain open. What matters now is whether the lawyer you call knows which door is which, because the difference between a case that survives this ruling and one that dies with it is not luck — it is legal theory, filed correctly, in the right courthouse, before the clock runs out.
We are Attorney911 — The Manginello Law Firm, PLLC. We take toxic tort and product liability cases in Missouri, and we are writing this page for one person: someone who used Roundup, got sick, and just read that the Supreme Court ruled against a Missouri resident who tried to do the same thing. The ruling is real and it is significant. But the headline does not tell the whole story, and the whole story is what you need before you decide whether to call a lawyer or walk away.
What the Supreme Court Actually Decided in Monsanto v. Durnell
On June 26, 2026, the United States Supreme Court ruled 7–2 in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act — known as FIFRA — preempts states from requiring pesticide manufacturers to add warnings to their product labels beyond those approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The case reached the Supreme Court from Missouri, where a jury had found Monsanto liable in October 2023 for failing to include a cancer warning on its glyphosate-based Roundup herbicide. The plaintiff was a Missouri resident who alleged that decades of applying Roundup as part of his job caused him to develop non-Hodgkin lymphoma.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh said Congress intended pesticide labels to be governed by a uniform federal system under FIFRA rather than varying state requirements. He said that allowing juries in different states to require different warning labels would undermine the national labeling system Congress established. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson disagreed, writing that the EPA’s decision to approve a label without a cancer warning “does not itself impose a labeling requirement” and therefore should not preempt states from holding manufacturers liable for inadequate warnings under their own laws.
The practical effect is this: the Missouri jury verdict is reversed, and state-law failure-to-warn claims that seek to require cancer warnings on pesticide labels beyond what the EPA approved are no longer viable — anywhere in the country. That is a major change. But it is not the end of Roundup litigation. It is the end of one theory within that litigation.
Can I Still Sue Monsanto and Bayer After This Ruling?
Yes — but the path is different, and the theory matters more now than it ever did. The Supreme Court eliminated the failure-to-warn theory that anchored the Durnell case and most of the prior Roundup verdicts nationwide. That theory held that Monsanto knew or should have known of glyphosate’s carcinogenic potential and failed to include a cancer warning on Roundup labels. That specific claim — a state-law duty to add label warnings the EPA did not require — is now preempted by FIFRA.
But three other legal theories remain available:
Design defect (strict products liability). This theory does not depend on the label. It asks whether the product itself was unreasonably dangerous in its formulation — whether the foreseeable risks of the glyphosate-based design outweighed its utility, or whether a safer alternative design existed. This claim survived the Supreme Court’s ruling because it does not seek to impose a labeling requirement; it challenges the product’s design. The analysis from environmental groups and legal commentators following the decision confirms that design defect claims remain viable.
Breach of express or implied warranty. Claims that Monsanto’s representations about Roundup’s safety breached warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose also remain available. These claims require showing the product failed to perform as warranted and caused the plaintiff’s injury — not that the label should have said something different.
FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting failure. This is the lesser-known safeguard the Court itself emphasized. FIFRA includes an ongoing affirmative duty on pesticide manufacturers to report to EPA any new information indicating a registered pesticide may have unreasonable adverse effects — including carcinogenicity findings from scientific studies, academic research, or internal corporate data. If discovery reveals Monsanto possessed scientific information indicating glyphosate may cause unreasonable adverse effects but failed to report it to EPA, that failure could support both regulatory enforcement and serve as evidentiary support for remaining tort theories. Manufacturers that fail to disclose such evidence to EPA can face civil and criminal penalties.
The difference between a lawyer who reads the headline and a lawyer who reads the decision is the difference between a dismissed case and a filed one. The failure-to-warn theory is gone. The case is not.
The IARC Versus EPA Conflict: Why Scientific Disagreement Is Your Evidence
The central evidentiary battleground in every remaining Roundup claim is the conflict between two scientific authorities that reached opposite conclusions about whether glyphosate causes cancer.
In 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer — the cancer research arm of the World Health Organization — classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans.” That classification was based on a review of scientific evidence including epidemiological studies of exposed workers and laboratory studies of the chemical’s mechanisms. IARC’s conclusion has been the primary scientific authority supporting plaintiffs’ causation theories in Roundup litigation.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has repeatedly concluded the opposite — that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” Because of that conclusion, the EPA has not required a cancer warning on Roundup labels. And it is that federal position that the Supreme Court majority said must control over varying state requirements.
Here is what a generalist gets wrong about this conflict: they treat the EPA’s position as proof the product is safe. It is not. The EPA’s position is a regulatory determination about labeling requirements under a specific federal statute. It is not a scientific finding that glyphosate cannot cause cancer in any individual. The IARC classification remains a legitimate, peer-reviewed scientific conclusion that a jury can weigh against the EPA’s contrary position. Environmental groups and public-interest attorneys have emphasized since the ruling that EPA’s approval of a label “does not mean a product is safe” and that the ruling puts EPA in the position of gatekeeper for how pesticides are labeled — but does not make EPA the final word on whether a product caused a specific person’s cancer.
In a design defect case, the IARC classification is not preempted. It is evidence. And the gap between what Monsanto’s internal scientists knew and what the company reported to the EPA under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) is where the case is won.
Missouri Law: Your State’s Framework After the Ruling
Missouri is where the Durnell case began, and Missouri law still governs the remaining claims even after the Supreme Court’s federal preemption ruling. The state’s legal framework offers several advantages that remain fully intact — the ruling changed the federal preemption question, not Missouri’s tort law.
Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Missouri’s personal injury statute of limitations is five years — one of the longest in the United States. For toxic tort cases involving latent disease, Missouri courts have applied a discovery rule, meaning the clock does not necessarily start on the date of exposure. Instead, it may begin when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its causal relationship to the defendant’s product. For someone diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma years or decades after occupational Roundup use, the question is when they first learned — or should have learned — that their cancer might be connected to glyphosate exposure. Five years from that discovery date is the window, and it is a generous one. But it is not infinite, and the evidence that proves the connection deteriorates with every passing month.
Pure comparative fault. Missouri applies a pure comparative fault system. This means your recovery is reduced by your allocated percentage of fault, but it is not barred entirely even at high fault percentages. If a jury finds you were partly responsible for your own exposure — perhaps by not wearing protective equipment — your recovery is reduced by that percentage. It is never automatically erased. That is exactly why the defense works so hard to pin fault percentage points on the plaintiff. Every point is money.
No statutory caps on compensatory damages in product liability. Unlike Missouri’s medical malpractice regime, which imposes statutory caps on certain damages, Missouri imposes no statutory caps on compensatory damages in product liability cases. This means the full measure of your economic and non-economic losses is recoverable — medical expenses, lost wages, lost earning capacity, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of quality of life.
Punitive damages. Missouri permits punitive damages upon a showing of willful misconduct, wanton disregard, or deliberate indifference to consumer safety. Missouri’s tort reform legislation has heightened the pleading standard for punitive damages claims, meaning you must meet a higher threshold at the pleading stage to pursue them. But if discovery reveals Monsanto possessed internal evidence of carcinogenic risk and deliberately chose not to report it under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) — or actively suppressed unfavorable research — that theory remains viable independent of the preempted failure-to-warn claim.
Strict products liability framework. Missouri follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts framework for strict products liability, though courts have increasingly engaged with Restatement (Third) design-defect analysis. Under the Second framework, a product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. The design defect theory asks whether the foreseeable risks of the glyphosate formulation outweighed its utility, or whether a safer alternative design existed — such as lower glyphosate concentrations, surfactants with reduced dermal penetration, or less toxic active ingredients that maintained agricultural efficacy.
The EPA’s decision to approve a label without a cancer warning “does not itself impose a labeling requirement” and therefore should not preempt states from holding manufacturers liable for inadequate warnings under their own laws. — Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, dissenting in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
That dissent is not law. But it is a roadmap. Jackson’s reasoning identifies the gap the majority left open: the EPA approved a label, but that approval does not affirmatively require the absence of a cancer warning. It simply did not require one. The distinction matters for the theories that survive — design defect and warranty claims do not ask whether the label was wrong. They ask whether the product was dangerous and whether the company stood behind its safety claims.
Who You Are Actually Suing: Monsanto, Bayer, and the Corporate Structure
The defendant in a Roundup case is not a simple entity. Understanding the corporate structure matters because it determines who holds the assets, who controls the litigation strategy, and where the money actually sits.
Monsanto Company is the original manufacturer of glyphosate-based Roundup herbicide. It designed, formulated, registered, marketed, and distributed the product. It controlled all label content submitted to the EPA for approval. It owed the duty to warn consumers of known health risks and to report adverse effects information under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2). Monsanto maintained its longtime corporate headquarters in Creve Coeur, Missouri — a suburb of St. Louis — which is why so much Roundup litigation has been filed in Missouri courts.
Bayer AG is the German multinational pharmaceutical and life sciences conglomerate that acquired Monsanto in 2018 for approximately $63 billion. Through that acquisition, Bayer assumed Monsanto’s tort liability exposure — including tens of thousands of pending Roundup cancer lawsuits. Bayer controls the corporate strategy regarding litigation defense, settlement, and product reformulation decisions. After the acquisition, Bayer made a strategic decision to remove glyphosate from U.S. consumer Roundup products in 2023, amid ongoing litigation — but the company continued to market glyphosate-based Roundup for agricultural use, which is where most occupational exposure occurs.
The corporate-structure reality is this: Monsanto is the entity that made the product and controlled the science. Bayer is the entity that bought the liability. Both are defendants. The coverage tower behind them is not a standard insurance policy — Bayer is a balance-sheet defendant with the resources to litigate aggressively and the financial incentive to push every case toward the lowest possible resolution. Post-ruling, that incentive is stronger than ever, because the primary liability driver — failure-to-warn — has been eliminated.
Bayer’s CEO stated publicly that the “decision is good for American farmers who help feed the world” and that it “provides the regulatory clarity necessary for innovators like us to develop the agricultural tools that guarantee an affordable food supply.” That is a corporate victory lap. Environmental groups sharply criticized the decision, with one senior attorney stating the ruling “allows Monsanto and other chemical companies to avoid responsibility when their labels leave people unprotected from serious harm.”
The truth is between those two statements — and it is closer to the environmental groups’ position than Bayer’s. The ruling narrows the path. It does not close the courthouse.
The Medicine: Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma From Glyphosate Exposure
If you or someone you love has non-Hodgkin lymphoma and a history of significant Roundup exposure, the medical reality of this disease is something your lawyer must understand at a level a generalist never will. This is not a soft-tissue injury that resolves with physical therapy. This is a blood cancer.
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma is a hematologic malignancy — a cancer of the lymphatic system, which is part of the body’s immune system. It begins in white blood cells called lymphocytes, which are produced in the bone marrow and carried through the lymph nodes, spleen, and other lymphoid tissues. When lymphocytes become abnormal, they multiply uncontrollably and collect in lymph nodes or other organs, forming tumors and interfering with the body’s ability to fight infection.
The diagnostic process typically begins when a patient presents with painless swollen lymph nodes, persistent fatigue, unexplained weight loss, night sweats, or recurrent infections. A biopsy of an affected lymph node confirms the diagnosis, and pathology reports identify the specific subtype — because non-Hodgkin lymphoma is not one disease but a category of more than sixty subtypes, each with different treatment protocols and prognoses. The most common subtype in adults is diffuse large B-cell lymphoma, which is aggressive but often treatable. Other subtypes are indolent — slow-growing but potentially incurable.
Treatment depends on the subtype and stage but typically involves multi-cycle chemotherapy regimens. The most common regimen is R-CHOP — a combination of rituximab, cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, vincristine, and prednisone — administered in cycles over several months. Treatment may also include radiation therapy, particularly for localized disease. In relapsed or refractory cases, patients may require immunotherapy, targeted therapy, or stem cell transplantation — either autologous (using the patient’s own stem cells) or allogeneic (using donor stem cells). Each of these escalations carries its own risks, costs, and recovery timelines.
The cost of treatment is substantial. Multi-cycle chemotherapy regimens, biologic drugs like rituximab, potential stem cell transplantation, long-term surveillance for recurrence, and management of treatment-related complications — all generate medical expenses that climb into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and in cases requiring transplant, well beyond. For an occupationally exposed plaintiff with decades of product application history, the economic damages are significant: accumulated medical costs, lost wages during treatment, diminished earning capacity, and potentially vocational disablement.
Non-economic damages are equally real: the physical pain of the disease and its treatment, the emotional distress of a cancer diagnosis, the loss of quality of life, and the persistent fear of recurrence. Cancer survivors live with surveillance — periodic scans, blood tests, and the anxiety that precedes each one — for years, sometimes for life. That ongoing psychological burden is compensable, and a life-care planner builds it into the damages model.
If the plaintiff has died or predeceases resolution, the case shifts to survival and wrongful-death damages. Survival damages cover the period of injury the plaintiff endured during life — the pain, the treatment, the knowledge of the disease. Wrongful-death damages cover funeral expenses, loss of consortium, and pecuniary loss to statutory beneficiaries — the spouse, children, and other family members who depended on the deceased.
The Evidence Clock: What Exists, Who Holds It, and How Fast It Dies
Toxic tort cases live or die on evidence that has an expiration date. The Supreme Court ruling did not change that — it made it more urgent, because the remaining theories demand more specific proof than the failure-to-warn theory ever did.
Monsanto/Bayer internal scientific research and ghostwriting records. These documents prove corporate knowledge of glyphosate’s potential carcinogenicity. They may reveal suppression or manipulation of unfavorable findings. They support design defect and punitive damages theories. Much of this material was already produced in prior Roundup discovery, but new internal post-2023 research must be targeted. These records are subject to document retention policies and potential destruction. Priority: high. The preservation letter goes out the day you call.
FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) adverse effects reports submitted to EPA. These establish whether Monsanto disclosed all known carcinogenicity evidence to the EPA. Gaps between internal knowledge and reported information support fraud and concealment theories — and are independent of the preempted failure-to-warn claim. These are federal records retained under federal records schedules, but they must be specifically requested through FOIA or EPA litigation discovery. Priority: medium.
EPA registration files, label approval correspondence, and scientific review documents. These show what information EPA considered when approving Roundup labels and reveal whether Monsanto submitted complete or selective data. Federal agency records retained under federal records schedules. Priority: medium.
Plaintiff’s occupational exposure history and employment records. This is the foundation of specific causation — the dose reconstruction showing frequency, duration, and intensity of Roundup application over years or decades. Employment records deteriorate over time. Coworker witness availability diminishes. Product purchase receipts and application logs may be lost. Priority: high. Every year that passes, a coworker who remembers how much Roundup was used and how often retires, moves, or dies. The window to lock in testimony closes silently.
Plaintiff’s complete medical records including pathology reports and treatment history. These document the non-Hodgkin lymphoma diagnosis, subtype, treatment course, prognosis, and treatment-related complications. They must be obtained before records are archived or destroyed. Treating physician availability for testimony is time-sensitive. Priority: high.
IARC monograph and supporting epidemiological literature on glyphosate carcinogenicity. This is the foundational general causation evidence — the 2015 IARC classification is the primary scientific authority supporting the plaintiff’s causation theory against the EPA’s contrary position. Published scientific literature is permanent. Priority: low — this evidence will be there whenever you need it.
The fastest-dying evidence is the plaintiff’s own exposure history. Employment records, coworker memories, purchase receipts, and application logs all deteriorate with time. The preservation letter that freezes Monsanto’s internal documents is important — but so is the work of documenting your own exposure before the people who can corroborate it are gone.
The Insurance-Defense Playbook: What Bayer Will Try After This Ruling
The defense playbook changed the day the Supreme Court ruled. Here is what Bayer’s lawyers will do — and here is the counter to each play.
Play 1: “Your case is over — the Supreme Court ruled against Roundup plaintiffs.” This is the first thing you will hear, and it is designed to make you walk away before you talk to a lawyer. The counter: the ruling eliminated one legal theory — failure-to-warn — not all of them. Design defect and breach of warranty claims remain viable. A lawyer who reads the decision, not just the headline, knows this. The defense is counting on you reading only the headline.
Play 2: “The EPA says glyphosate is not carcinogenic — your cancer didn’t come from Roundup.” The defense will wave the EPA’s conclusion like a shield. The counter: the EPA’s regulatory determination about labeling requirements is not a scientific finding that glyphosate cannot cause cancer in any individual. The IARC classification — “probably carcinogenic to humans” — remains legitimate, peer-reviewed scientific evidence that a jury can weigh against the EPA’s contrary position. Causation in a design defect case is proven through expert testimony on general causation (glyphosate can cause NHL) and specific causation (this plaintiff’s exposure profile caused their NHL). The EPA’s position is evidence the defense can offer — but it is not conclusive, and it does not preempt the jury’s ability to hear both sides.
Play 3: “You can’t prove design defect when the EPA approved the product.” The defense will argue that EPA registration and approval constitute evidence the product is not unreasonably dangerous. The counter: EPA registration under FIFRA is not a finding that a product is safe in all respects — it is a registration that the product meets federal labeling and use requirements. A jury can find that a product meets regulatory minimums and is still unreasonably dangerous in its design, particularly when an alternative design existed that would have reduced the risk. The alternative design theory explores whether Monsanto could have reformulated Roundup with lower glyphosate concentrations, incorporated surfactants with reduced dermal penetration, or substituted less toxic active ingredients while maintaining agricultural efficacy.
Play 4: Low settlement offers calibrated to reduced liability probability. Before the ruling, comparable Missouri Roundup cases produced verdicts ranging from several million to tens of millions of dollars, and Bayer had settled substantial portions of its Roundup docket through a multi-billion-dollar settlement program. Post-ruling, the defense will calibrate settlement offers to the reduced liability probability — the absence of the failure-to-warn theory makes the case harder to prove and the path to recovery less certain. The counter: a well-prepared design defect case with strong internal-knowledge evidence and a clean dose reconstruction still carries significant value. The deep-pocket defendant and the severe injury support a substantial demand. But mediation leverage is diminished, and the honest evaluation is that settlement valuations will be lower and trial more likely.
Play 5: Delay aimed at the statute of limitations. The defense may use the ruling to create a narrative that your case is weak, hoping you delay long enough for the limitations clock to run. The counter: Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations is among the most favorable in the nation, and the discovery rule for latent disease means the clock may not have started when you think it did. But every month of delay is a month of evidence deterioration. The defense does not need you to give up — it needs you to wait.
How a Design Defect Case Is Actually Built After Durnell
Here is how a Roundup case is built now — the chronological walk from the day you call to the day a number is on the table.
Week one. The preservation letter goes out — to Monsanto, to Bayer, and to any third-party custodian of records. That letter demands they freeze internal scientific research, ghostwriting records, FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) submissions, EPA correspondence, and all documents relating to glyphosate’s carcinogenic potential. It also demands they preserve any post-2023 internal research generated after Bayer removed glyphosate from consumer products. The letter is the first shot — it converts routine document destruction into spoliation if they let evidence die after receiving it.
Weeks two through four. The records demands begin. FOIA requests go to the EPA for Monsanto’s FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) adverse effects reports, registration files, and label approval correspondence. Employment records, product purchase records, and application logs are requested from the plaintiff’s employers and suppliers. Medical records are pulled from every treating facility — pathology reports, treatment summaries, imaging, lab results, and physician notes.
Months two through six. Expert witnesses are retained. A board-certified toxicologist and epidemiologist must establish general causation — that glyphosate can cause non-Hodgkin lymphoma. This is where the IARC-versus-EPA conflict is addressed head-on. The expert must explain why IARC’s classification is the more scientifically reliable assessment, and why the EPA’s contrary conclusion does not foreclose the causation question. An oncologist and industrial hygienist must establish specific causation through dose reconstruction — matching the plaintiff’s exposure profile to known mechanistic pathways. A life-care planner builds the future-cost stream. A forensic economist reduces it to present value.
Months six through twelve. Discovery opens the defendant’s files. The target is the gap between Monsanto’s internal scientific knowledge and its FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting to EPA. Evidence that the company possessed carcinogenicity data and failed to disclose it supports both the design defect claim and the punitive damages theory. Depositions of corporate scientists, regulatory affairs personnel, and decision-makers follow. This is where the case is won or lost — not in the courtroom, but in the deposition room where the company’s choices are locked in under oath.
The number. The damages model is built from all of it: past and future medical expenses, lost wages and diminished earning capacity, the life-care plan in today’s dollars, household services, pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of quality of life, and — if the evidence supports it — punitive damages for deliberate indifference to consumer safety. The defense’s first offer will be a fraction of it. The question is whether the liability path is strong enough to push past that offer — and post-ruling, that question is harder to answer than it was before June 26, 2026.
What a Case Like This Is Worth After the Ruling
We will be honest with you about what the Supreme Court’s ruling did to case values, because honesty is the only thing that protects you.
Before the ruling, comparable Missouri Roundup cases produced verdicts ranging from several million to tens of millions of dollars. Bayer had settled substantial portions of its Roundup docket through a multi-billion-dollar settlement program. The failure-to-warn theory was the primary liability driver — it was the theory that anchored the Durnell verdict and most of the prior Roundup verdicts nationwide. With that theory eliminated, case values compress.
Post-ruling, the case value range for a Roundup non-Hodgkin lymphoma case in Missouri runs from approximately $250,000 on the low end to approximately $5,000,000 on the high end. The low end reflects cases where causation proof is weak — limited exposure history, alternative causes of the lymphoma, or difficulty matching the exposure profile to known mechanistic pathways. The high end reflects cases with strong occupational exposure documentation, clear diagnostic and treatment records, compelling internal-knowledge evidence from Monsanto, and a punitive damages theory that survives pleading.
The factors that move a case toward the high end include: decades of documented occupational exposure with specific product purchase and application records; a clear non-Hodgkin lymphoma diagnosis with pathology-confirmed subtype and treatment history; internal Monsanto documents showing knowledge of carcinogenic potential that was not reported to EPA under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2); expert testimony that addresses the IARC-versus-EPA conflict persuasively; and a plaintiff with significant economic losses — high pre-injury earnings, substantial medical expenses, and a long expected worklife that was cut short.
The factors that push toward the low end include: limited or poorly documented exposure history; competing causes of the lymphoma; difficulty establishing specific causation; absence of compelling internal-knowledge evidence; and a plaintiff with modest economic losses.
The deep-pocket defendant — Bayer — and the severe injury — non-Hodgkin lymphoma — support significant value. But the liability-path uncertainty introduced by this ruling functions as a major deflator. Causation remains contested between IARC’s “probably carcinogenic” classification and EPA’s contrary position, complicating both general and specific causation proof. A lawyer who tells you your case is worth the same as it was before the ruling is not telling you the truth. A lawyer who tells you it is worthless is also not telling you the truth.
What to Do in the First 72 Hours If You Have NHL and a Roundup Exposure History
If you have been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma and you have a significant history of occupational Roundup exposure, here is what to do — and what not to do — in the immediate aftermath of learning about the Supreme Court ruling.
First: do not give up based on the headline. The headline says the Supreme Court sided with Bayer. The decision says failure-to-warn is preempted. Those are different statements. Your case may still have value under design defect and warranty theories — but only if you talk to a lawyer who knows the difference.
Second: document your exposure history now. Write down every job where you used Roundup, the years you worked, how often you applied the product, how you applied it (handheld sprayer, backpack sprayer, tractor-mounted rig), whether you wore protective equipment, and whether you were ever exposed to drift or overspray. List coworkers who might corroborate your exposure. Identify any purchase records, application logs, or employment records that document your use. This information deteriorates — coworkers move, retire, or pass away. Employment records get archived or destroyed. Your own memory of specific details fades. Write it down while it is fresh.
Third: secure your medical records. Obtain complete copies of your pathology reports, treatment summaries, imaging studies, lab results, and physician notes. These documents are the foundation of your damages case. Hospitals and clinics operate on retention schedules — records can be archived, moved to off-site storage, or destroyed after a set period. Get them now.
Fourth: do not sign anything from Monsanto, Bayer, or any claims administrator. If you receive a letter, a check, or a settlement offer from the company or anyone representing the company, do not sign it, do not cash it, and do not return it. A release attached to a quick check can extinguish your rights before you have spoken to a lawyer.
Fifth: do not give a recorded statement to anyone. If an insurance representative, a claims adjuster, or a company investigator contacts you and asks you to “just tell us what happened” on a recording, decline. That recording is built to be quoted against you — to pin down dates, exposures, and statements that the defense will later use to narrow your case.
Sixth: call a lawyer. Not just any lawyer — a lawyer who handles toxic tort cases, who understands FIFRA preemption, who knows the difference between a failure-to-warn claim and a design defect claim, and who can tell you honestly whether your case has a path forward after this ruling. The consultation is free. If we are not the right fit for your case, we will tell you. If we are, the preservation letter goes out that week.
Who We Are and How We Work
We are Attorney911 — The Manginello Law Firm, PLLC. We have been taking catastrophic injury, wrongful death, and toxic tort cases since 2001. We work on contingency — 33.33% before trial, 40% if the case goes to trial. We do not get paid unless we win your case. The consultation is free, and it is confidential.
Ralph Manginello has spent 27+ years in courtrooms, including federal court. He is admitted to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas. He was a journalist before he was a lawyer — he reads the decision, not the headline, and he builds cases on what the law actually says, not what the press release claims. He is the managing partner of this firm, and his name goes on every case we take.
Lupe Peña is a former insurance-defense attorney who spent years inside a national defense firm — the rooms where adjusters and their software decided how to deny, delay, and devalue people exactly like you. He knows how the other side values claims, how it selects IME doctors, and how it uses surveillance and social media to undermine plaintiffs. He now sits on your side of the table. He is fluent in Spanish and conducts full client consultations in Spanish without an interpreter.
We handle toxic tort and product liability cases in Missouri and nationwide. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsanto v. Durnell changed the legal landscape for Roundup litigation — but it did not change our approach. We read the decision. We identify the surviving theories. We build the case on design defect, breach of warranty, and FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting failures. We send the preservation letter before the evidence disappears. We retain the right experts — toxicologists, epidemiologists, oncologists, industrial hygienists, life-care planners, and forensic economists — who can address the IARC-versus-EPA conflict head-on and match your exposure profile to your disease.
If your loved one has died from non-Hodgkin lymphoma and had a significant Roundup exposure history, we also handle wrongful death claims — where the survival and wrongful-death damages apply, including funeral expenses, loss of consortium, and pecuniary loss to statutory beneficiaries.
If we are not the right firm for your case, we will tell you — and we will point you toward someone who is. That is not generosity. That is integrity, and it is the same thing we would want for our own families.
Past results depend on the facts of each case and do not guarantee future outcomes.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is my Roundup case over after the Supreme Court ruling?
No — not necessarily. The Supreme Court eliminated the failure-to-warn theory, which held that Monsanto should have added a cancer warning to Roundup labels beyond what the EPA approved. That specific claim is now preempted by FIFRA nationwide. But design defect claims, breach of warranty claims, and FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting-failure theories remain viable. Your case is not over — it needs to be built on a different legal theory than the one the Supreme Court struck down.
Can I still file a new Roundup lawsuit in Missouri?
Yes. Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions is among the longest in the United States, and Missouri courts have applied a discovery rule for latent disease cases — meaning the clock may start when you discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the connection between your illness and Roundup exposure. If you have been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma and have a significant occupational Roundup exposure history, you should consult a lawyer promptly to determine whether your claim is still within the limitations window.
What is FIFRA preemption and how does it affect my case?
FIFRA — the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act — is the federal statute governing pesticide registration, labeling, sale, and use in the United States. Under FIFRA, no pesticide may be sold without an EPA-approved registration and label. The Supreme Court held that this federal labeling regime occupies the field — meaning states cannot impose labeling requirements that would mandate additional or different label warnings. The practical effect is that state-law failure-to-warn claims seeking to require cancer warnings on pesticide labels are preempted. But design defect claims, warranty claims, and FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting-failure theories are not failure-to-warn claims and are not preempted by this ruling.
What legal theories remain available after Monsanto v. Durnell?
Three primary theories remain. Design defect (strict products liability) asks whether the product itself was unreasonably dangerous in its formulation — whether the foreseeable risks of glyphosate outweighed its utility, or whether a safer alternative design existed. Breach of warranty claims hold that Monsanto’s representations about Roundup’s safety breached warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. FIFRA Section 6(a)(2) reporting-failure theory targets evidence that Monsanto possessed carcinogenicity data and failed to report it to the EPA — which can support both regulatory enforcement and serve as evidentiary support for the remaining tort theories, including punitive damages.
How long do I have to file a Roundup cancer lawsuit in Missouri?
Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions — one of the longest in the country. For latent disease cases like cancer, Missouri courts have applied a discovery rule, meaning the clock may not start on the date of exposure but rather when you knew or reasonably should have known of your injury and its causal connection to Roundup. The exact accrual date is case-specific and should be evaluated by a lawyer familiar with Missouri’s toxic tort latent disease standards. Do not assume the clock has expired without consulting counsel — but do not delay, because the evidence that supports your claim deteriorates with every passing month.
What is the difference between a failure-to-warn claim and a design defect claim?
A failure-to-warn claim says the product’s label should have included a warning that the manufacturer did not include — in this case, a cancer warning on Roundup. That claim is now preempted by FIFRA. A design defect claim says the product itself was unreasonably dangerous in its formulation — not that the label was wrong, but that the product was designed in a way that made it too dangerous to use as intended. Design defect does not depend on the label. It asks whether the foreseeable risks of the glyphosate formulation outweighed its utility, or whether a safer alternative design existed. That claim is not preempted by the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Does the EPA’s position that glyphosate is safe mean I cannot win?
No. The EPA’s conclusion that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans” is a regulatory determination about labeling requirements under FIFRA — it is not a scientific finding that glyphosate cannot cause cancer in any individual. The International Agency for Research on Cancer classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” in 2015, and that classification remains legitimate, peer-reviewed scientific evidence. In a design defect or warranty case, both the EPA’s and IARC’s positions are evidence that a jury can weigh. The EPA’s position is evidence the defense can offer — but it does not preempt the jury’s ability to hear both sides and decide whether your cancer was caused by Roundup.
What if I was partly at fault for my own exposure?
Missouri follows a pure comparative fault system. Your recovery is reduced by your allocated percentage of fault, but it is not barred entirely — even if you were significantly at fault. If a jury finds you were partly responsible for your exposure, your award is reduced by that percentage. The defense will work hard to pin fault on you — arguing you did not wear protective equipment, did not follow label instructions, or used the product carelessly. Every percentage point they assign to you is money off your recovery. That is why documenting your exposure history and your adherence to safety practices matters from the beginning.
How much is my Roundup cancer case worth after the ruling?
The Supreme Court’s ruling compressed case values by eliminating the failure-to-warn theory that drove the largest Roundup verdicts. Post-ruling, the case value range in Missouri runs from approximately $250,000 on the low end to approximately $5,000,000 on the high end. The value depends on the strength of your exposure documentation, the clarity of your medical diagnosis, the quality of internal Monsanto evidence showing knowledge of carcinogenic risk, the persuasiveness of your expert testimony on the IARC-versus-EPA conflict, and your economic losses. A lawyer who gives you a number without evaluating these factors is guessing. A lawyer who gives you a number after evaluating them is doing the work.
What should I do if I have non-Hodgkin lymphoma and used Roundup?
Document your exposure history — every job, every year, every product, every application method. Secure your complete medical records — pathology reports, treatment summaries, imaging, lab results. Do not sign anything from Monsanto, Bayer, or any claims administrator. Do not give a recorded statement to anyone. And call a lawyer who handles toxic tort cases and understands the difference between a preempted failure-to-warn claim and a viable design defect claim. The consultation is free. The call costs nothing. The cost of not calling — if the evidence disappears or the clock runs — is everything.
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The Supreme Court ruling changed the path. It did not close the door. If you have non-Hodgkin lymphoma and a history of significant Roundup exposure, the question is not whether you still have a case — it is whether the lawyer you call knows which theories survived and how to build them.
Call us at 1-888-ATTY-911. The consultation is free. We do not get paid unless we win your case. We have live staff available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week — not an answering service, but people who can take your call and start the process.
Contact us through our website or call directly. We handle toxic tort and product liability cases in Missouri and nationwide, working with local counsel where required.
Hablamos Español. Lupe Peña conducts full client consultations in Spanish without an interpreter — because the legal system should not require you to speak a second language to understand your rights.
The decision in Monsanto v. Durnell is a setback. It is not a surrender. The path is narrower, the proof is harder, and the defense is emboldened. But the product is the same, the injury is the same, and the company that made both is the same. What changed is the theory — not the truth.
Learn more about our practice areas or meet our attorneys. The call is free. The evidence is dying. The clock is running. 1-888-ATTY-911.