
Missouri Roundup Settlement Update: What the Supreme Court Preemption Ruling and August 19 Hearing Mean for Your Glyphosate Cancer Claim
You used Roundup. Maybe for years — on the farm, at the landscaping job, around the yard every weekend. Then the diagnosis came: non-Hodgkin lymphoma. You sat in a chair while chemicals dripped into your arm, or you watched someone you love go through it. You heard about the lawsuits against Monsanto and Bayer. Maybe you filed one. Maybe you were about to. Now you are reading that the Supreme Court ruled against plaintiffs, that Bayer is settling thousands of cases for billions, and that a judge in St. Louis is set to hold a hearing on August 19 to decide whether that settlement gets final approval. And you are wondering — with everything you have been through — whether your case still matters. Whether it is too late. Whether the Supreme Court just erased your right to hold anyone accountable.
It did not. The legal landscape shifted — we will not pretend it did not. But it did not collapse. What changed is which doors are open and which ones the Supreme Court closed. The failure-to-warn door — the theory that Monsanto should have put a cancer warning on the label — that door is now shut, locked by federal preemption law. But the design-defect door, the negligent-testing door, the manufacturing-defect door — those remain open. And for cases filed in Missouri, there are structural advantages this state offers that most others do not: a five-year statute of limitations, pure comparative fault that does not bar recovery no matter how much fault is assigned to you, and no statutory cap on compensatory or punitive damages in product liability actions. The fight is harder than it was a year ago. It is not over.
We are Attorney911 — The Manginello Law Firm, PLLC. We are a trial firm that takes toxic tort and product liability cases in Missouri, working with local counsel where required. Ralph Manginello has spent 27+ years in courtrooms, including federal court. Lupe Peña spent years inside a national insurance-defense firm — the rooms where claims like yours are priced, devalued, and denied — and now sits on your side of the table. We are writing this page because the news you are reading about the Supreme Court ruling and the settlement is written for investors analyzing Bayer’s stock price, not for the person who has non-Hodgkin lymphoma and needs to know what their rights are today. This page is for you.
The August 19 St. Louis Hearing: What Happens and What It Means for You
On August 19, a court in St. Louis will hold a hearing on final approval of a class settlement valued at approximately 6.3 to 7.25 billion dollars — a settlement designed to resolve a substantial portion of the remaining US glyphosate cases against Bayer and its subsidiary, Monsanto. This hearing is not a trial. No one is presenting evidence to a jury about whether Roundup caused anyone’s cancer. This is a procedural milestone in the class-action settlement approval process — a judge examining whether the settlement terms are fair, adequate, and reasonable for the class members covered by it.
Here is what that means for you, practically. If your case is part of the class that this settlement covers, the August 19 hearing is the moment where the court decides whether the deal goes through. If the court grants final approval, the settlement terms become binding on class members who have not opted out — meaning your compensation would be determined by the settlement matrix, a tier system that assigns standardized values based on injury category and exposure metrics. If you are considering opting out of the class to pursue an individual case, the opt-out deadline — which is tied to the settlement approval process — is something you need to understand now, not after the hearing.
St. Louis is not an accidental venue. The 22nd Judicial Circuit — the St. Louis City circuit court — has been a central forum for mass tort litigation against Monsanto for years, partly because of the company’s deep corporate roots in the greater St. Louis metropolitan area. Missouri courts, particularly in St. Louis City, have developed a reputation as plaintiff-friendly venues for pharmaceutical and product liability mass torts, with experienced mass tort judiciary and jury pools that tend to be more receptive to plaintiff claims than many other jurisdictions. That matters because venue — where your case is filed — can significantly affect its value and its outcome. The Mass Litigation Panel in St. Louis has historically coordinated complex toxic tort dockets, and that institutional experience is an asset for any individual glyphosate case filed there.
The hearing on August 19 is a date on a calendar. Your statute of limitations does not pause for it. Your evidence does not stop degrading because a settlement is pending. And your right to pursue an individual case — if that is the better path for your situation — does not survive forever. If you have been waiting to see what happens with the settlement before talking to a lawyer, that wait is the most expensive thing you can do right now.
Monsanto v. Durnell: How the Supreme Court Changed Roundup Litigation
On June 25, the United States Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act — FIFRA — expressly preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims in glyphosate lawsuits. This is the ruling that reshaped the litigation landscape, and you need to understand exactly what it did and did not do.
FIFRA is the federal statute that governs the registration, labeling, and sale of pesticides in the United States. Under FIFRA, no pesticide may be distributed or sold unless it is registered by the EPA. The EPA reviews the product’s labeling and determines what warning statements are “necessary” and “adequate to protect health and the environment.” The EPA approved glyphosate product labels without a cancer warning — the EPA’s position being that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” Meanwhile, the International Agency for Research on Cancer — IARC — classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic,” a classification that has been central to the plaintiff’s case.
FIFRA contains an express preemption clause. Here is what it says:
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): A state “shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.”
The Supreme Court held that this clause means what it says. When a state-law failure-to-warn claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its labels — a warning the EPA specifically decided was not required — that state-law requirement is “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling requirements. And FIFRA says states cannot do that. The state tort claim, by requiring a labeling change the EPA did not require, is expressly preempted.
As the Supreme Court explained in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell: “state tort claim, by contrast, would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its labels. That Missouri-law requirement is” in addition to or different from the federal labeling requirements imposed under FIFRA and EPA’s registration determination approving the label without a cancer warning.
What this means in plain English: you cannot sue Monsanto under Missouri law for failing to warn you that Roundup could cause cancer, because the EPA — a federal agency — decided what the label had to say, and federal law says states cannot add requirements on top of that. The failure-to-warn theory — which was the backbone of the glyphosate mass tort — is now substantially weakened, and in most cases, barred.
But here is what the ruling did not do. It did not eliminate every legal theory. It did not say glyphosate cannot cause cancer. It did not say Monsanto is immune from all liability. And it did not close the courthouse door. It closed one door — the warning-label door — and left others open. Which doors remain open is the next question, and it is the most important one on this page.
What Legal Theories Survive After Preemption: Design Defect and Negligent Testing
The same Supreme Court jurisprudence that established FIFRA preemption for failure-to-warn claims also drew a clear line between claims that are preempted and claims that are not. That line was drawn in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), and it was reaffirmed by the Durnell decision.
As the Supreme Court held in Bates: “None of these common-law rules requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular way. Thus, petitioners’ claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty are not pre-empted.”
Read that again. Design defect claims. Manufacturing defect claims. Negligent testing claims. Breach of express warranty claims. All survive FIFRA preemption — because none of them require the manufacturer to change its label. They require something different: that the product was defectively designed, that it was manufactured improperly, that the company failed to test it adequately, or that it breached an express warranty about what the product would do.
This is the strategic fork in the road for any individual glyphosate case filed after Durnell. The complaint cannot plead a failure-to-warn theory — that claim is expressly preempted and will be dismissed. The complaint must instead plead theories that do not impose labeling requirements “in addition to” or “different from” the EPA-approved label. That means focusing on:
Design defect. The theory that glyphosate was defectively designed — that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, or that safer alternatives existed that would have achieved the same weed-control purpose without the carcinogenic risk. This theory does not require Monsanto to change its label. It requires Monsanto to answer for the design of the product itself. Under Missouri law, strict product liability reaches products sold “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous” when put to a reasonably anticipated use — a framework Missouri adopted in Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co. and codified in § 537.760 RSMo.
Negligent testing. The theory that Monsanto failed to exercise reasonable care in researching, testing, and conducting post-market surveillance of glyphosate’s carcinogenic potential. This is not a warning claim — it is a claim about what the company did or did not do to investigate the safety of its own product before and after it went to market. Did it conduct adequate long-term studies? Did it follow up on signals in the scientific literature? Did it investigate the mechanistic pathways by which glyphosate might cause DNA damage or immune system disruption? Negligent testing does not require a labeling change — it requires an answer for the company’s own conduct.
Manufacturing defect. If a specific batch or formulation of glyphosate deviated from its intended design in a way that made it more dangerous — a theory that depends on the specific product and formulation at issue in an individual case.
Breach of express warranty. If Monsanto made specific express representations about the safety of Roundup — in advertising, in marketing materials, in statements to consumers — that turned out to be false, a breach of express warranty claim may survive preemption because it is based on the company’s own statements, not on a requirement to add warnings to the label.
The generalist files a failure-to-warn claim, gets it dismissed on preemption grounds, and tells the client the case is over. The lawyer who has read Bates and Durnell files a design-defect and negligent-testing complaint that survives the preemption motion and gets to discovery. That difference — between a case that dies at the pleading stage and a case that gets to the evidence — is everything.
Missouri’s Five-Year Statute of Limitations: When Your Clock Starts
Missouri imposes a five-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions. The statutory text is deceptively broad — it covers “any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated.” For a glyphosate cancer claim, that five-year clock is governed by Missouri’s accrual rule, which is different from a simple “discovery rule” and is worth understanding precisely.
Missouri law provides that a cause of action does not accrue “when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.” For a latent disease like non-Hodgkin lymphoma — a cancer that may develop years or decades after exposure to a carcinogen — the damage is “sustained and capable of ascertainment” at the latest when the disease is diagnosed. That is when the five-year clock begins to run.
Per § 516.100 RSMo: a cause of action “shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.”
What this means for you: if you were exposed to Roundup for years but were not diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma until recently, the five-year clock did not start when you were exposed. It started — at the latest — when you were diagnosed. If you were diagnosed within the last five years, you are likely still within the statute of limitations. If the diagnosis was more than five years ago, the clock may have run, and you need to talk to a lawyer immediately to determine whether any exception or extension applies.
For wrongful death cases — where the person who developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma has died — Missouri’s wrongful death statute of limitations is a separate deadline that runs from the date of death, not the date of diagnosis. The two clocks are different, and if your loved one has died, you need to know which clock applies and how much time remains.
Here is the critical point: the statute of limitations does not pause because a class settlement is pending. It does not pause because the Supreme Court issued a ruling. It does not pause because you are waiting to see what happens at the August 19 hearing. Every day you wait is a day closer to the deadline — and a day further from the evidence you need to prove your case. The day you call a lawyer is the day the clock starts working for you instead of against you.
Missouri Strict Product Liability: The Law That Holds Manufacturers Accountable
Missouri adopted strict product liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A framework — a legal doctrine that holds manufacturers and sellers responsible for products that are sold in a defective condition and are unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Missouri codified this in § 537.760 RSMo, and the Missouri Supreme Court has confirmed that this statute reaches products sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use.
What “strict liability” means in practice: you do not have to prove that Monsanto was negligent — that it knew or should have known about the cancer risk. You have to prove that the product was defective and that the defect caused your injury. For a design-defect claim, that means proving that the product’s design — the formulation of glyphosate, the way it was meant to be used, the concentration at which it was sold — was unreasonably dangerous. For a manufacturing-defect claim, that means proving that a specific product deviated from its intended design.
This is where the post-Durnell strategy becomes concrete. Strict liability design-defect claims survive FIFRA preemption because they do not require a labeling change — they require the manufacturer to answer for the design of the product itself. Missouri’s strict liability framework, codified in § 537.760 RSMo, gives a plaintiff in St. Louis City or any other Missouri venue a legal theory that the Supreme Court did not close off.
The practical implication: a glyphosate case filed in Missouri on a design-defect theory can proceed to discovery — to the internal Monsanto documents, the scientific assessments, the testing data, the regulatory correspondence — without being dismissed on preemption grounds. That access to discovery is where cases are won or lost, because the evidence that proves what Monsanto knew and when it knew it is in the company’s own files.
Pure Comparative Fault in Missouri: Your Use of Roundup Does Not Bar Your Case
One of the questions we hear most often from people considering a glyphosate claim is: “I chose to use Roundup. Doesn’t that mean it is my fault?” The defense will certainly argue that — that you assumed the risk, that you should have known, that you used the product voluntarily. But Missouri law has a specific answer to that argument, and it is more favorable to you than in most states.
Missouri follows pure comparative fault. That means your recovery is reduced by your percentage of fault — but it is not barred entirely, no matter how much fault is assigned to you. Even if a jury found you 90 percent at fault for choosing to use Roundup, you would still recover 10 percent of the damages.
Per RSMo § 537.765(2): “Any fault chargeable to the plaintiff shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages but shall not bar recovery.”
This is the Missouri rule, established by the Missouri Supreme Court and codified by the legislature. There is no 50-percent bar. There is no 51-percent threshold. Pure comparative fault means what it says — your fault reduces your recovery, it does not eliminate it. This is different from many states that follow modified comparative fault with a 50- or 51-percent cutoff, and it is a structural advantage for plaintiffs in Missouri that the defense cannot change.
What this means for your case: the defense will try to pin percentage points on you — for choosing to use the product, for not wearing protective equipment, for using more than the label recommended. Every percentage point they can assign to you reduces your recovery. But they cannot zero you out. And the comparative-fault fight is a fight over percentages, not over whether you have a case at all. That fight is worth having, especially when the alternative is taking whatever the class settlement matrix offers.
Wrongful Death and Survival Claims: When Roundup Took Someone You Love
If your spouse, parent, child, or sibling was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma after years of Roundup exposure and has died — whether from the cancer itself or from complications of treatment — Missouri law provides specific rights for the family they left behind. Understanding the difference between survival damages and wrongful death damages is critical, because Missouri treats them differently and they are mutually exclusive.
Missouri’s wrongful death statute — §§ 537.080 and 537.090 RSMo — provides that when death results from an injury caused by a defective product, a wrongful death action accrues to statutory beneficiaries in three priority classes. First: the spouse, children, surviving lineal descendants of deceased children, or the father or mother. Second: if none in the first class, the brother or sister or their descendants. Third: if none in the first or second classes, a plaintiff ad litem appointed by the court.
The damages available in a Missouri wrongful death action are significant. The trier of fact may award damages for pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death — the financial support the family lost — plus funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which the beneficiaries have been deprived.
Per RSMo § 537.090: “the trier of the facts may give to the party or parties entitled thereto such damages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expens[es]”
Additionally, the wrongful death action may include damages the deceased suffered between injury and death — medical expenses and pain and suffering — as survivorship damages. But Missouri law makes survival actions and wrongful death actions mutually exclusive: when death results from the injury, the wrongful death action is the vehicle, and it absorbs the survivorship damages the decedent incurred before death.
This is a wrongful death case with a specific toxic-tort dimension. The proof requires establishing that the decedent was exposed to glyphosate, that the exposure caused or contributed to their non-Hodgkin lymphoma, and that the cancer caused their death. The damages include not only the financial losses the family has suffered — the income that stopped, the support that vanished, the companionship that was taken — but also the pain and suffering the decedent endured between diagnosis and death.
For families in this situation, the statute of limitations is measured from the date of death, not the date of diagnosis. If your loved one died within the past five years, you may still have a claim. If the death was more than five years ago, the deadline may have passed — but you should not assume that without talking to a lawyer, because the specific facts of your case may affect the accrual analysis.
Bayer, Monsanto, and Ruveon: The Corporate Structure Behind Your Case
Understanding who you are actually suing — and who is actually responsible — is not a formality in glyphosate litigation. It is the structural question that determines whether your case has collectibility, who controls the defense strategy, and what happens to your recovery if the corporate defendant restructures itself in the middle of the litigation.
The corporate structure here has three layers. Monsanto Company is the original manufacturer and marketer of Roundup and glyphosate products — the entity against which the underlying product liability, design-defect, and failure-to-warn claims were originally filed. Monsanto developed glyphosate, patented it, marketed it, and sold it for decades. Bayer AG is the German pharmaceutical and life sciences conglomerate that acquired Monsanto in 2018 — and in doing so, assumed the entire glyphosate litigation exposure as the ultimate corporate parent. Bayer is the entity funding the settlement, directing the global resolution strategy, and making the corporate decisions about how to manage the remaining litigation. Ruveon is the newly carved separate US glyphosate business entity that Bayer created to ring-fence its US glyphosate operations from its other divisions — a corporate restructuring designed to shield Bayer’s pharmaceutical, consumer health, and agricultural science divisions from the ongoing operational and litigation risk associated with glyphosate.
That restructuring — carving Ruveon out as a separate entity — is a move you need to understand because it is designed to do exactly what it does: limit the exposure of the broader corporate enterprise. When a company creates a subsidiary to hold a risky product line, the question for any plaintiff is whether the new entity has the assets to satisfy a judgment, or whether the parent corporation remains on the hook. In most cases, Bayer AG — as the parent that assumed Monsanto’s liabilities when it acquired the company — remains the primary source of recovery. But the Ruveon restructuring adds a layer of complexity that a generalist may not fully account for, particularly if future claims are directed at the new entity rather than at the parent.
For cases within the class settlement, this matters less — the settlement is funded by Bayer, and the class members’ recovery comes from the settlement fund. For individual cases proceeding outside the settlement — on design-defect or negligent-testing theories — the corporate structure is directly relevant to collectibility. The defendant you name, the entity you serve, and the corporate relationships you plead all affect whether a judgment is recoverable. This is not paranoia. This is what corporate-structure analysis looks like in a mass tort where the defendant has already demonstrated a willingness to restructure its operations to manage litigation exposure.
The generalist names Monsanto and moves on. The lawyer who understands corporate structure names the right entities, pleads the corporate relationships, and ensures that any judgment is collectible against the entity that actually has the assets — not the shell that was created to hold the risk.
The Medicine: Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma and Glyphosate Exposure
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma is a cancer that begins in the lymphatic system — the body’s network of lymph nodes, spleen, thymus, and bone marrow that is central to immune function. It is not a single disease but a group of more than 70 subtypes that vary in aggressiveness, treatment, and prognosis. The most common subtypes in glyphosate litigation include diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL), follicular lymphoma, mantle cell lymphoma, and chronic lymphocytic leukemia/small lymphocytic lymphoma — each with its own treatment protocol, survival rate, and causal-profile literature.
The diagnosis pathway typically begins when a patient presents with enlarged lymph nodes, persistent fatigue, unexplained weight loss, night sweats, or recurrent infections. A biopsy of an affected lymph node confirms the diagnosis and identifies the subtype — and that pathology report, specifying the exact NHL subtype, is the foundation of both the medical case and the legal case. Imaging — typically PET/CT scans — determines the stage, which ranges from Stage I (localized) to Stage IV (disseminated). Bone marrow biopsy may follow. Then comes the treatment: chemotherapy regimens like R-CHOP, radiation therapy, immunotherapy, stem cell transplants for relapsed or refractory cases, and in recent years, CAR-T cell therapy for patients who have failed multiple prior treatments.
The proof problem in a glyphosate case is causation — and it has two layers. General causation asks: can glyphosate exposure cause non-Hodgkin lymphoma in humans? The answer depends on which authority you ask. The IARC — the International Agency for Research on Cancer, a body of the World Health Organization — classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” (Group 2A) in 2015, based on limited evidence of carcinogenicity in humans and sufficient evidence in experimental animals. The EPA’s position is that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” This conflict — between the world’s leading cancer research agency and the US pesticide regulator — is the central scientific dispute in every glyphosate case, and it is why expert testimony on general causation is essential.
Specific causation asks: did THIS plaintiff’s glyphosate exposure cause THEIR non-Hodgkin lymphoma? This requires an individualized analysis — a dose reconstruction showing how much glyphosate the plaintiff was exposed to, over what period, through what route (dermal, inhalation, ingestion), and a differential diagnosis that rules out other known risk factors for NHL (age, family history, autoimmune disease, certain infections, prior chemotherapy, immunosuppressive medications). Expert testimony is legally required to establish both general and specific causation in toxic tort litigation — this is not a matter of argument but of admissibility, because Missouri courts apply the Daubert standard for expert witness qualification and testimony.
The defense will attack specific causation from every angle. They will argue that the plaintiff’s NHL was caused by something else — age, genetics, other chemical exposures, autoimmune conditions. They will argue that the plaintiff’s glyphosate exposure was too low or too brief to have caused cancer. They will challenge the dose reconstruction methodology, the differential diagnosis, and the expert’s qualifications. The defense has spent years and millions of dollars developing these challenges, and they have an arsenal of pre-cross-examined literature at their disposal.
This is why the specific-causation expert is the most important witness in an individual glyphosate case. A board-certified toxicologist or physician with expertise in occupational and environmental medicine, who has performed a thorough individualized dose assessment and differential diagnosis, who can withstand a Daubert challenge and a brutal cross-examination — that expert is the difference between a case that survives summary judgment and a case that does not.
Evidence That Builds a Glyphosate Case — and How Fast It Disappears
Every toxic tort case is an evidence race, and glyphosate cases are no exception. The evidence that proves your exposure, your diagnosis, and the causal link between them exists right now — in records, in documents, in testimony — but it is degrading on a clock that does not stop for settlement proceedings, Supreme Court rulings, or your decision about whether to call a lawyer.
Purchase and usage records for Roundup products. These establish your exposure history — how long you used the product, how frequently, in what quantities. Retailer records and receipts degrade over time. Personal records — half-remembered brand names, empty bottles in the garage, notes from a landscaping business — may be lost during estate administration in wrongful death cases. The longer you wait, the harder it becomes to reconstruct what product you used, when you bought it, and how much you applied.
Complete medical records including pathology reports. Your medical records confirm the NHL diagnosis and identify the specific subtype — information that is critical to both damages valuation and specific-causation analysis. Hospital record retention policies vary; older records may be archived, moved to off-site storage, or destroyed. Pathology slides and reports are the gold standard — they are typically retained longer than clinical records — but they, too, have retention limits. Obtaining complete records from every treating facility, from diagnosis through current treatment, is the foundation of the damages case.
Occupational and residential exposure documentation. If your exposure was occupational — you were a landscaper, a groundskeeper, a farmer, a maintenance worker, a parks employee — your employment records, job descriptions, coworker statements, and site documentation establish the duration and intensity of your exposure. These records deteriorate with personnel turnover, business closures, and the natural passage of time. Coworkers who can describe how Roundup was used — how often, in what quantities, with what protective equipment (if any) — move, retire, and pass away. If your exposure was residential — you used Roundup in your own yard for years — the documentation is more personal: your own testimony, family members who can corroborate, photographs of the property, receipts from hardware stores or garden centers.
Internal Monsanto and Bayer corporate documents from prior discovery productions. In the years of glyphosate litigation that preceded the settlement, plaintiff counsel obtained millions of pages of internal Monsanto documents through discovery — documents showing the company’s scientific assessments, its strategy for responding to the IARC classification, its communications with regulators, and its approach to scientific literature. Many of these documents are under protective orders, and access requires coordination with prior plaintiff counsel. But they exist, and they are central to the design-defect and negligent-testing theories that survive preemption. The lawyer who knows where these documents are and how to access them has a head start that the generalist does not.
EPA regulatory filings, the IARC monograph, and the scientific literature database. These establish the regulatory and scientific context for both general causation and the preemption defense. The regulatory dockets are generally stable — they are public records maintained by federal agencies — but ongoing EPA re-registration decisions may alter the preemption landscape. The IARC monograph classifying glyphosate as probably carcinogenic is a public document that serves as the foundation for the general-causation expert’s opinion. The scientific literature — epidemiological studies, mechanistic studies, toxicological studies — is the battleground where the general-causation fight is waged.
The preservation letter — a formal demand to the defendant and all relevant third parties to preserve evidence — is the tool that freezes these records before they can be legally destroyed. In a product liability case against a major corporation, the preservation letter goes out early. It identifies the categories of evidence the defendant must retain, puts the company on notice that evidence destruction will have legal consequences, and creates a record of what existed at the time notice was given. If evidence is destroyed after a preservation letter is on file, the law provides remedies — including adverse-inference instructions that allow the jury to assume the lost evidence was as damaging as the plaintiff claims, and sanctions that can range from monetary penalties to striking defenses.
What a Roundup Cancer Case Is Worth: Individual vs. Class Settlement
The value of a glyphosate case depends on which path it takes — the class settlement or the individual case — and the two produce very different outcomes for very different reasons.
The class settlement path. The aggregate settlement value of 6.3 to 7.25 billion dollars reflects compensation across thousands of claimants with varying injury profiles, predominantly non-Hodgkin lymphoma at different stages. Within the class settlement, individual compensation is determined by a settlement matrix — a tier system that assigns standardized values based on injury category (diagnosis subtype, stage at diagnosis, treatment received) and exposure metrics (duration of use, frequency of application, occupational vs. residential exposure). The matrix produces a number — but that number is a category average, not an individualized assessment of what your specific case is worth. For claimants with severe injuries, long exposure histories, and strong specific-causation evidence, the matrix may undervalue the case. For claimants with weaker exposure histories or less severe injuries, the matrix may represent a fair or even favorable outcome.
The individual case path. For cases proceeding outside the class settlement — on design-defect, negligent-testing, or manufacturing-defect theories — the value range is significantly wider. Based on our analysis of the post-Durnell landscape, individual cases remaining outside the settlement could range from approximately $50,000 on the low end to $2,500,000 or more on the high end, depending on injury severity, the strength of the exposure history, the viability of the non-preempted claims, and the venue.
Why the range is so wide: the Supreme Court’s preemption ruling has narrowed the universe of viable claims, which puts downward pressure on individual case values. But cases with strong exposure histories, clear NHL diagnoses confirmed by pathology, robust specific-causation experts, and favorable Missouri venues — particularly St. Louis City — can command higher values, especially if discovery produces internal corporate documents that support a punitive-damages theme.
Punitive damages. Missouri does not impose statutory caps on compensatory or punitive damages in product liability actions — making it a potentially high-exposure venue for manufacturers. However, constitutional limits on punitive damages ratios apply under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has held that “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” That means punitive damages are typically capped at a single-digit multiplier of compensatory damages — not eliminated, but bounded by constitutional principles.
As the Supreme Court held in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003): “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”
Punitive damages in glyphosate litigation have historically been driven by allegations that Monsanto manipulated scientific literature, ghostwrote studies, and influenced regulatory processes — allegations that, if proven through internal corporate documents, could support a punitive-damages submission even on a design-defect theory. The preemption ruling narrowed the universe of viable claims, but it did not eliminate the punitive-damages pathway for claims that survive.
The decision between the class settlement and the individual case is the single most important strategic choice in a post-Durnell glyphosate claim. It depends on the strength of your exposure history, the specifics of your diagnosis, the viability of non-preempted claims, the venue available to you, and the time and resources required to pursue an individual case through discovery and trial. This is not a decision to make based on a news article about Bayer’s stock price. It is a decision to make with a lawyer who has read Durnell, understands the surviving theories, and can evaluate your individual case against the settlement matrix.
If you want a deeper look at how case values are assessed, Ralph Manginello breaks down what your case is worth in a video that walks through the same evaluation framework we use.
The Defense Playbook: What Bayer’s Lawyers Do — and How We Counter Each Move
Mass tort defendants do not defend cases one at a time. They defend them with a playbook — a set of standardized strategies designed to reduce the value of every claim, push claimants toward the lowest-cost resolution, and discourage individual litigation. Lupe Peña spent years inside a national insurance-defense firm, and he knows this playbook from the inside. Here are the plays you are likely to face, and the counter to each one.
Play 1: “Your case is preempted — take the settlement.” The defense will tell you that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsanto v. Durnell means your case is over, and the class settlement is the best you can get. This is an overstatement designed to push you toward the lowest-cost resolution. The counter: Durnell preempted failure-to-warn claims — not all claims. Design defect, negligent testing, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty survive preemption under Bates v. Dow Agrosciences. Your case is not preempted if it is pled on a surviving theory. The defense is counting on you not knowing the difference.
Play 2: The specific-causation gauntlet. The defense will demand that you prove, through expert testimony, that YOUR glyphosate exposure caused YOUR non-Hodgkin lymphoma — and they will challenge every element of that proof. They will attack your dose reconstruction, your differential diagnosis, your expert’s qualifications, and your exposure history. The counter: build the specific-causation case early and thoroughly. Obtain complete medical records including pathology. Document the exposure history with every available source — purchase records, employment records, coworker statements, personal testimony. Retain a qualified specific-causation expert who can perform an individualized dose assessment and differential diagnosis and withstand Daubert scrutiny. The defense’s specific-causation challenge is a gauntlet, not a wall — it is passable with the right expert and the right evidence.
Play 3: The “EPA says it’s safe” narrative. The defense will lean heavily on the EPA’s position that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans” — arguing that the federal regulator’s assessment should control over the IARC classification. The counter: the EPA’s assessment and the IARC classification answer different questions using different standards and different evidence. The IARC classification is based on a systematic review of the scientific literature by an international body of cancer experts. The EPA’s assessment is a regulatory determination made through a specific statutory framework. A jury is entitled to hear both — and the conflict between them is itself evidence that the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate is not settled science. On a design-defect theory, the question is not what the label says — it is whether the product was unreasonably dangerous, and that question can be answered with the IARC monograph, the mechanistic studies, and the epidemiological literature.
Play 4: The opt-out deadline trap. The class settlement has an opt-out deadline — a date by which class members must affirmatively elect to pursue individual cases outside the settlement. If you miss that deadline, you are bound by the settlement terms — including the matrix value, which may be less than your case is worth. The defense counts on claimants not understanding the deadline, not evaluating their individual case value, and defaulting into the class. The counter: get an individualized case evaluation before the opt-out deadline. Understand what your case is worth on an individual theory versus what the matrix offers. Make the opt-out decision deliberately, not by default.
Play 5: The delay-and-deplete strategy. The defense knows that evidence degrades, witnesses become unavailable, and claimants grow tired of waiting. Every month of delay is a month closer to the statute of limitations, a month further from the evidence, and a month of pressure on a claimant who may be dealing with cancer treatment or grieving a loss. The counter: move fast. The preservation letter goes out the day you call. The records demands go out within days. The expert is retained early. The case is built while the defense is still assuming you will take the settlement. Speed is not just about the statute of limitations — it is about building leverage by demonstrating that you are prepared to try the case, not just settle it.
For more on what not to say when the adjuster or defense representative calls, watch this video on what you should never say to an insurance adjuster — the same principles apply to defense representatives in product liability cases.
How We Build a Glyphosate Case From the First Call
Here is what happens when you call us about a glyphosate case — not in generalities, but in the specific steps that turn a phone call into a case with a chance of winning.
Week one: the intake and the preservation letter. We take the details — your Roundup use history, your diagnosis, your treatment, your timeline. We send a preservation letter to the defendant and any relevant third parties, demanding that evidence be retained. We begin obtaining your complete medical records, including the pathology report that confirms your NHL diagnosis and subtype. We identify potential exposure-documentation sources — employment records, purchase records, coworker statements, personal testimony.
Weeks two through four: the records and the expert evaluation. The medical records come in. We review them with the specific-causation analysis in mind — not just what the diagnosis is, but what the pathology shows, what the treatment history reveals, and what confounders need to be ruled out. We begin the process of identifying and retaining a qualified specific-causation expert — a toxicologist or physician with expertise in occupational and environmental medicine who can perform an individualized dose assessment and differential diagnosis. In parallel, we evaluate the class settlement matrix to determine what your case would be worth in the settlement versus what it might be worth on an individual theory.
Months one through three: the complaint and the preemption analysis. If the individual case path is the right strategy, we draft a complaint that pleads surviving theories — design defect, negligent testing, manufacturing defect — and does not plead failure-to-warn, which is preempted. We file in the venue that gives the case the best chance — in Missouri, St. Louis City has historically been a favorable forum for plaintiff-side product liability cases. We anticipate the defense’s preemption motion and build the complaint to withstand it.
Months three through twelve: discovery and expert work. Discovery in a glyphosate case is where the case is built. We serve document demands targeting Monsanto’s internal scientific assessments, its IARC-response strategy, its testing protocols, its regulatory submissions, and its post-market surveillance records. We take depositions of the corporate witnesses who can explain the company’s decisions — the scientists who assessed the carcinogenic potential, the regulatory affairs personnel who communicated with the EPA, the executives who made business decisions about the product’s continued sale. The specific-causation expert completes the dose reconstruction and differential diagnosis, and the general-causation expert prepares the literature-based opinion on glyphosate carcinogenicity.
The resolution phase: settlement positioning or trial. With the discovery complete and the experts prepared, the case is positioned for resolution — either through a settlement that reflects the individual case value (not the class matrix), or through trial. At trial, the case is presented to a jury — in Missouri, twelve people from the community where the case is filed — who decide whether the product was defectively designed, whether the company negligently tested it, and what the plaintiff’s injuries are worth.
This is the walk, not the summary. Every step takes time, resources, and the kind of focused attention that comes from a firm that knows how these cases are built. The first step — the phone call — is the one that starts the clock working for you.
Your First Steps: What to Do Right Now
If you used Roundup and were diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma — or if someone you love was diagnosed and has died — here is what you should do, and what you should not do, starting today.
Do gather your exposure documentation. Every piece of evidence that shows you used Roundup — receipts, empty containers, photographs of the property where you used it, employment records if your exposure was occupational, statements from coworkers or family members who can corroborate your use. Write down what you remember: what product you used (Roundup, Roundup Pro, Roundup Quick Pro, generic glyphosate), what concentration, how you applied it (sprayer, backpack, hose-end), how often (weekly, monthly, seasonally), for how many years, and whether you wore protective equipment. This information degrades with time — memories fade, records are lost, witnesses become unavailable. Write it down now.
Do obtain your complete medical records. The pathology report from your lymph node biopsy is the single most important medical document — it confirms the diagnosis and identifies the subtype. Get it. Get every treatment record, every imaging report, every hospital admission summary. If your loved one has died, get the death certificate and the complete medical records from the date of diagnosis forward. These records are the foundation of both the damages case and the specific-causation analysis.
Do understand the opt-out deadline. If your case is covered by the class settlement, there is a deadline by which you must elect to opt out and pursue an individual case. Find out what that deadline is. Do not let it pass by default. If you miss it, you are bound by the settlement matrix — and if your case is worth more on an individual theory, that default decision costs you money.
Do not give a recorded statement to the defense. If a representative of Monsanto, Bayer, Ruveon, or their insurance carriers contacts you — by phone, by letter, by email — do not give a recorded statement. Do not sign anything. Do not discuss your medical history, your exposure history, or your case. Anything you say can and will be used to devalue your claim. Refer them to your lawyer. If you do not have a lawyer yet, tell them you are not prepared to discuss the matter and end the conversation.
Do not accept a quick settlement check. If a check arrives with a release attached — and it may, especially if your case is in the settlement class — do not cash it and do not sign the release until you have had it reviewed by a lawyer. Signing a release extinguishes your claim. Cashing a check that comes with a release may be construed as acceptance of the settlement terms. These documents are designed to resolve your case quickly and cheaply — before you understand what it is worth.
Do not post about your case on social media. The defense monitors social media. Posts about your health, your activities, your daily life — anything that can be taken out of context to minimize your injuries or contradict your testimony — will be found and used. Assume everything you post is being read by someone whose job is to devalue your case.
Do call a lawyer. The statute of limitations does not pause. The evidence does not stop degrading. The opt-out deadline does not extend. The day you call is the day the preservation letter goes out, the records demands begin, and the clock starts working for you instead of against you. The consultation is free. We do not get paid unless we win your case.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I still file a Roundup lawsuit after the Supreme Court preemption ruling?
Yes — but the legal theories available to you have changed. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsanto v. Durnell preempted failure-to-warn claims, meaning you cannot sue Monsanto for failing to put a cancer warning on the label. But design defect, negligent testing, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims survive preemption under Bates v. Dow Agrosciences. Your case must be pled on a surviving theory, and that requires a lawyer who understands the distinction between preempted and non-preempted claims.
Should I join the class settlement or file an individual case?
It depends on the strength of your exposure history, the specifics of your diagnosis, and the viability of non-preempted claims. The class settlement matrix assigns standardized values based on injury category and exposure metrics — it is designed for efficiency, not individualized assessment. If your case is strong — long-term exposure, clear NHL diagnosis, strong specific-causation evidence — an individual case on a design-defect theory may be worth more than the matrix offers. If your exposure history is weaker or your case presents proof challenges, the settlement may be the better outcome. This is a decision to make with a lawyer after an individualized evaluation, not based on a news article.
How much is my Roundup cancer case worth?
Individual cases outside the class settlement could range from approximately $50,000 to $2,500,000 or more, depending on injury severity, exposure history strength, and the viability of non-preempted claims. Cases within the class settlement are valued according to the settlement matrix. Missouri’s lack of statutory damage caps in product liability cases and its pure comparative fault rule are structural advantages that can increase individual case values relative to other states. No lawyer can guarantee a specific outcome — past results depend on the facts of each case and do not guarantee future outcomes.
How long do I have to file a glyphosate lawsuit in Missouri?
Missouri imposes a five-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions under § 516.120(4), RSMo. For a latent disease like non-Hodgkin lymphoma, the clock starts — at the latest — when the disease is diagnosed, not when you were exposed to Roundup. If you were diagnosed within the last five years, you are likely within the statute. For wrongful death cases, the clock runs from the date of death. Do not assume the deadline has passed without talking to a lawyer — the specific facts of your case may affect the accrual analysis.
What if my loved one died from non-Hodgkin lymphoma after using Roundup?
Missouri’s wrongful death statute — §§ 537.080 and 537.090 RSMo — provides that when death results from a defective product, the surviving spouse, children, or parents may recover damages for pecuniary losses, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support. The wrongful death action may also include damages the deceased suffered between injury and death — medical expenses and pain and suffering. The wrongful death statute of limitations runs from the date of death, not the date of diagnosis.
Does the Monsanto v. Durnell ruling kill my Roundup case?
No — but it changes how your case must be pled. The ruling preempted failure-to-warn claims, which were the backbone of the glyphosate mass tort. But the Supreme Court’s own precedent in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences confirms that design defect, negligent testing, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims are not preempted because they do not require labeling changes. A case pled on these surviving theories can proceed to discovery and trial. The defense will argue that your case is preempted — that is a strategy, not a fact. The counter is a complaint that pleads the right theories.
What is Ruveon and does it affect my ability to collect damages?
Ruveon is a newly created separate US entity into which Bayer carved its glyphosate business, designed to ring-fence the operational and litigation risk of glyphosate from Bayer’s other divisions. For cases within the class settlement, this matters less — the settlement is funded by Bayer. For individual cases, the corporate structure is relevant to collectibility — which entity you name, which entity has the assets, and which entity is legally responsible. Bayer AG, as the parent corporation that acquired Monsanto and assumed its liabilities, remains the primary source of recovery in most cases. But the Ruveon restructuring adds a layer of complexity that requires careful defendant identification and corporate-structure pleading.
What evidence do I need for a Roundup cancer case?
You need three categories of evidence: exposure documentation (purchase records, usage history, employment records, personal testimony, corroborating witnesses), medical records (pathology reports confirming NHL diagnosis and subtype, treatment records, imaging, prognosis), and expert testimony (a general-causation expert on whether glyphosate can cause NHL, and a specific-causation expert on whether YOUR exposure caused YOUR cancer). Internal corporate documents from prior Monsanto litigation — showing the company’s scientific assessments, testing practices, and regulatory strategy — are critical to design-defect and negligent-testing theories and may be accessible through coordination with prior plaintiff counsel.
Is it too late to join the Roundup settlement?
The class settlement is pending final approval at the August 19 hearing in St. Louis. If your case is covered by the class, you may still be able to participate — but the opt-out deadline, which determines whether you are bound by the settlement or can pursue an individual case, is tied to the settlement approval process. If you are considering opting out, you need to understand the deadline now. If you are considering participating, you need to understand what the matrix offers and whether it fairly compensates your injuries. Either way, the decision should be made with full information, not by default.
What if I used Roundup years ago but was just diagnosed with cancer?
Missouri’s accrual rule means the statute of limitations clock starts when the damage is “sustained and capable of ascertainment” — which, for a latent disease like non-Hodgkin lymphoma, is at the latest when the disease is diagnosed. If you were exposed to Roundup decades ago but were diagnosed within the last five years, you are likely within the statute of limitations. The exposure history is harder to reconstruct with the passage of time — which is why documenting what you remember now, while memories are fresh, is so important.
Why Attorney911: The Team Behind the Fight
We are not a firm that stumbled into toxic tort litigation last year. We are a trial firm built for the fights that take everything — the corporate defendants with unlimited resources, the legal landscape that shifts under your feet, the cases that require every ounce of knowledge, preparation, and persistence a lawyer can bring.
Ralph P. Manginello has spent 27+ years in courtrooms, including federal court. He was a journalist before he was a lawyer — he knows how to find the story the evidence tells, and he knows how to tell it to a jury. He is admitted in Texas and in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, and he leads our trial team on the complex product liability and toxic tort cases that demand a lawyer who has been in the fight for decades. Ralph does not lose cases because he did not prepare. He prepares until the evidence is frozen, the experts are ready, and the case is built.
Lupe Peña spent years inside a national insurance-defense firm — the rooms where claims like yours are priced, devalued, and denied. He knows how the defense sets reserves in the first 48 hours. He knows how the recorded-statement call is engineered. He knows how the specific-causation challenge is built, how the preemption motion is drafted, and how the settlement matrix is designed to resolve claims for less than they are worth. He also knows where those strategies break — because he used to build them. Now he uses that knowledge for injured people. And he does it in English or in Spanish, fluently, without an interpreter.
We handle these cases on contingency. That means you pay nothing out of pocket. We advance the costs of building the case — the records, the experts, the discovery, the depositions. We do not get paid unless we win your case. If we recover compensation for you, our fee is 33.33% before trial and 40% if the case goes to trial. If we do not recover, you owe us nothing. That is not a marketing line — it is the fee structure, stated plainly, because you deserve to know the terms before you make the call.
We serve your family fully in Spanish. Hablamos Español. Lupe conducts complete consultations in Spanish without an interpreter, and our bilingual staff is here for every step of the process.
Past results depend on the facts of each case and do not guarantee future outcomes. We have recovered over $50 million dollars for our clients — including a $5 million-plus brain-injury settlement, a $3.8 million-plus amputation settlement, a $2.5 million-plus truck-crash recovery, and a $2 million-plus maritime back-injury settlement. Those results were earned on the facts of those cases. Your case will be evaluated on its own facts, and we will tell you honestly what we believe it is worth.
The call is free. The consultation is confidential. The number is 1-888-ATTY-911 — that is 1-888-288-9911. We answer 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with live staff, not an answering service. If you are reading this at 2am, wondering whether the Supreme Court just took away your right to hold someone accountable for your cancer — call us. We will tell you the truth about what the ruling means, what your options are, and what we can do. If we are not the right fit for your case, we will tell you that too. But if you have a case worth fighting, we will fight it — on the theories that survive, in the venue that gives you the best chance, with the evidence that tells the truth about what happened to you.
The August 19 hearing is coming. The statute of limitations is running. The evidence is degrading. And somewhere in a corporate office, someone is counting on you not calling. Prove them wrong. Call 1-888-ATTY-911.