When a Workboat Sinks at Anchor in Calm Water — Maritime Wrongful Death Claims for Crew Lost in Aquaculture Vessel Disasters
A vessel that sinks at anchor, in calm weather, while its crew sleeps aboard — that is not an accident. That is a question. The question is what was wrong with the boat, who knew it, and who is responsible for putting eight men to sleep inside a hull that could not stay afloat. If you are reading this page because someone you love was aboard a vessel that went down — whether the Koñimo 1 in Chile’s Reloncaví Estuary or a crew boat in the Gulf, a supply vessel off the coast, or an aquaculture workboat anywhere — you are in the right place. We are Attorney911, The Manginello Law Firm. We handle maritime wrongful death and catastrophic injury cases. This page exists to tell you what the law actually says, what the companies are already doing, and what your family must do in the days that matter most — before the evidence and the witnesses are gone.
The facts of this specific sinking are public: a catamaran-type salmon farming support vessel, the Koñimo 1, sank at approximately 4:00 AM on a Monday while anchored 70 meters from shore in the Reloncaví Estuary near Cochamó, in Chile’s Los Lagos region. The crew of eight had finished infrastructure maintenance work for Salmones Austral and was resting inside the vessel. Two crew members survived by swimming to shore. Three bodies have been recovered. Three remain missing and presumed dead. The charterer, Salmones Austral, has stated the vessel “sank while anchored 70 metres from the shore under normal weather conditions” and that the vessel “had all its permits up to date.”
“We have been informed that the vessel sank while anchored 70 metres from the shore under normal weather conditions.” — Salmones Austral, public statement on the sinking of the Koñimo 1.
That sentence — “normal weather conditions” — is the most important phrase in the entire public record of this disaster. Because a vessel that sinks in calm water at anchor is not the victim of weather. It is the victim of itself. And under maritime law, that raises a doctrine the vessel owner cannot escape.
What Maritime Law Says When a Vessel Sinks With Crew Aboard
The Unseaworthiness Doctrine: When the Vessel Itself Is the Problem
There is a word in maritime law older than most countries — unseaworthiness. It means the vessel and all its gear were not reasonably fit for their intended use. The doctrine is absolute and non-delegable: the vessel owner owes the crew a warranty that the vessel is seaworthy, and the owner is liable even if they were not personally negligent. A frayed cable, a corroded hull, a failed bilge pump, an untrained deckhand — any of these can make a vessel unseaworthy. The owner cannot delegate this duty away by blaming a contractor or a supplier.
A catamaran-type workboat that sinks at anchor in calm weather is a prima facie unseaworthiness case. The law starts from the presumption that something about the vessel — its hull integrity, its watertight bulkheads, its bilge pumping capacity, its freeboard, its hull-to-deck joints — was not reasonably fit to keep the crew alive while they slept. The vessel owner must answer for that.
Under U.S. maritime law, the unseaworthiness doctrine runs alongside a separate Jones Act negligence claim — giving a seaman two shots, not one. The first proves the company was careless. The second proves the vessel itself was not safe, regardless of fault. The owner is responsible for an unseaworthy vessel even if it took every possible care. That is the doctrine’s power, and it is why vessel owners fight so hard to keep their hulls certified.
Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, punitive damages are not available on an unseaworthiness claim — The Dutra Group v. Batterton (2019) settled that. But compensatory damages — the full economic and human loss — are available, and for six families who lost wage-earning crew members, that is a number that reaches into the millions per decedent in a U.S. forum.
The Jones Act: If a U.S. Connection Exists
This sinking occurred in Chilean territorial waters and is governed by Chilean maritime law — not the law of any U.S. state. That is the honest jurisdictional truth, and any family considering legal action needs to hear it before anyone tells them otherwise. But U.S. maritime law becomes relevant if a U.S. connection — what lawyers call a “nexus” — exists. That nexus could be a U.S.-citizen crew member, a U.S.-flagged parent company, a U.S.-domiciled insurer, or a corporate structure that routes through American subsidiaries. If discovery reveals such a connection, the legal landscape changes entirely.
The Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 30104) lets a seaman — a crew member with a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation — sue their employer in front of a jury. The Jones Act deliberately imports the injured-railroad-worker rulebook, which means the employer can be on the hook even if the crew member’s own carelessness played a part. The causation standard is the lowest in American injury law: the employer is liable if its negligence played “any part, even the slightest” in producing the injury. Comparative fault reduces but never bars recovery. Assumption of risk is abolished. Any contract designed to let the employer off the hook is void.
If a Jones Act claim were available, the damages would be full tort damages — past and future lost earnings, full medical care, and pain and suffering — with no statutory cap. That is a fundamentally different framework from Chilean civil law, where wrongful death claims (acción de indemnización por daño moral y patrimonial) produce more modest awards, where punitive damages are not a standard feature, and where moral damages are historically more conservative than U.S. non-economic damages.
The Death on the High Seas Act: The Three-Mile Line
There is a federal statute called the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 30302) that governs wrongful deaths occurring “beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States.” DOHSA is narrow: only the spouse, parents, children, or a dependent relative can bring the claim, and recovery is limited to pecuniary losses — lost financial support, lost services, funeral costs. Survivors cannot recover for grief, loss of society, or loss of companionship under DOHSA. That three-mile line is a guillotine: a death at 2.9 miles may allow broader damages under general maritime law; at 3.1 miles, DOHSA strips non-economic recovery entirely.
For this Chilean sinking, DOHSA would only be relevant if a U.S. nexus existed and if the death occurred in U.S. waters beyond three miles — which it did not. But the doctrine illustrates how maritime wrongful death law is built: every mile, every flag, every crew status classification changes the entire case. Getting the classification right is the whole ballgame.
The Limitation of Liability Act: The Shipowner’s Escape Hatch
Every maritime wrongful death case must contend with the Limitation of Liability Act (46 U.S.C. § 30523), an 1851 statute that lets a vessel owner try to cap everything they owe at the post-accident value of the vessel plus its pending freight. For a catamaran workboat that has sunk, the post-accident value may be near zero — meaning the owner could argue that all six wrongful death claims are worth the scrap value of a wreck.
The catch: the owner can only limit liability if the dangerous condition arose “without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” If the owner knew about the hull defect, the corroded bulkhead, the failed bilge system — or if the owner’s own negligence contributed to the sinking — the limitation shield falls. This is where thorough investigation cracks the defense open. A vessel owner who maintained inspection records showing hull thinning, or who received crew complaints about water ingress, cannot claim ignorance. The limitation action must be filed within six months of receiving written notice of a claim — and it can pull all claims into a single federal admiralty court, stripping the jury. Preserving the date written notice was given is its own piece of evidence.
The Defendant Stack: Who Is Responsible When a Contractor’s Vessel Sinks
The Vessel Owner: Koñimo Company
The Koñimo 1 was owned and operated by Koñimo company, a Chilean infrastructure maintenance contractor that provided sporadic services to Salmones Austral. As the vessel owner, Koñimo owed the crew an absolute, non-delegable warranty of seaworthiness. The vessel had to be reasonably fit for its intended use — including safe crew accommodation for overnight resting. A catamaran that sinks at anchor in normal weather raises questions that the owner must answer:
- Hull integrity — Was there corrosion, fatigue cracking, or a hull breach that allowed water ingress?
- Watertight bulkheads — Were the watertight compartments between the catamaran’s hulls intact and properly sealed?
- Bilge pumping — Did the bilge systems function? Were they capable of handling the rate of water ingress?
- Freeboard adequacy — Was the vessel loaded within safe limits, with sufficient freeboard to prevent swamping?
- Hull-to-deck joints — These are notoriously vulnerable in catamaran workboats, where the joint between the deck and the twin hulls can fail under stress or corrosion.
- Emergency egress — Could the sleeping crew escape the vessel quickly enough when it began to sink? Were hatches accessible from sleeping quarters? Were personal flotation devices within reach?
“Permits up to date” is a compliance statement, not a seaworthiness statement. A vessel can have every permit, every certification, and every inspection stamp current — and still be unseaworthy on the night it sank. Permits verify paperwork. Seaworthiness is a condition. The two are not the same, and the gap between them is where the case lives.
The Charterer: Salmones Austral
Salmones Austral is the salmon farming operation that hired Koñimo’s vessel and crew for infrastructure maintenance work at its aquaculture center. The crew had finished its work at 6:00 PM and was resting aboard the vessel when it sank at 4:00 AM — meaning Salmones Austral’s work assignment placed the crew aboard that vessel overnight, 70 meters from shore.
Under maritime doctrines analogous to charterer liability and the borrowed-servant principle, the entity that controls the voyage or work assignment that places crew aboard a vessel may share responsibility for conditions it knew or should have known existed. Salmones Austral selected Koñimo’s vessel, retained it for its operations, and directed the work that kept the crew at its aquaculture center overnight. If Koñimo had prior safety incidents, inspection failures, or compliance deficiencies that Salmones Austral knew or should have discovered before retaining its services, the charterer faces a negligent hiring/retention theory.
The Chilean salmon sector has faced industry-wide calls to take responsibility for contractor safety — a point underscored by prior aquaculture fatalities in the region, including a diver death at a Mowi salmon farm in Chile. The Aquaculture Stewardship Council and Chilean salmon industry standards impose contractor safety expectations on farming companies. Salmones Austral’s public statement that the vessel “had all its permits up to date” is a defense posture, not an exoneration. The question is not whether the paperwork was current. The question is whether the vessel was safe to sleep aboard.
The Corporate Structure: Following the Money
A vessel owner like Koñimo may be a thinly capitalized contractor with limited assets and modest insurance. Salmones Austral, as a significant salmon farming operation, likely has meaningful corporate resources and insurance coverage. The coverage tower — the layered stack of primary, excess, and umbrella policies — determines what is actually collectible. A judgment against a judgment-proof contractor is a piece of paper. A judgment against a well-resourced charterer is a recovery.
Identifying every entity in the chain — the vessel owner, the charterer, any management company, any insurer, any parent corporation — is the first investigative task. Corporate structures in the aquaculture industry are designed to separate operations from liability, just as they are in every industry. Piercing that structure requires facts: who controlled the work, who knew about the vessel’s condition, who benefited from the crew’s labor.
The Evidence Clock: What Proof Exists and How Fast It Dies
Every maritime wrongful death case is a race against evidence destruction. The records that prove why the vessel sank are perishable — some on a schedule measured in days, others in weeks, others in the time it takes saltwater to finish corroding what the sinking began. Here is what exists, who holds it, and how fast it can die.
The Hull: The Central Causation Proof
The raised vessel hull is the single most important piece of evidence in this case. The breach location, corrosion patterns, fatigue cracking, watertight compartment integrity, and condition of the hull-to-deck joints will tell investigators exactly how and why the vessel sank. Per related coverage, the vessel has been or is being raised. The hull condition must be documented forensically — photographed, measured, metallurgically tested — before salvage handling, atmospheric exposure, and continued corrosion degrade the evidence. Every day post-salvage, the hull tells less of its story. A naval architect specializing in catamaran stability and watertight integrity should examine the hull before it is cleaned, repaired, or scrapped.
Voyage Data Recorder and Onboard Systems
If the Koñimo 1 carried a voyage data recorder, GPS track, or onboard monitoring systems, that electronic data may show the vessel’s orientation, bilge alarm activation, water ingress timeline, and whether the crew had any warning before the sinking. Electronic data on marine systems has limited retention cycles and degrades after prolonged submersion in saltwater. The data must be extracted immediately upon recovery — before salt corrosion destroys the circuits, before the storage medium degrades beyond readability.
Maintenance and Inspection Records
The maintenance and inspection records for the Koñimo 1 establish whether hull inspections, stability assessments, and safety-equipment servicing were current — and whether known defects were left unaddressed. These records may be dispersed across Koñimo company files, third-party service providers, and Chilean maritime authority registries. Contractor records are vulnerable to loss, especially when a contractor faces a catastrophic incident. A preservation letter to Koñimo company and Salmones Austral is urgent — not next month, not after the investigation concludes, but now.
Crew Certification and Training Records
Crew certification and qualification records establish whether the crew were properly licensed, trained in emergency procedures, and briefed on vessel-specific evacuation protocols. Chilean maritime authority records may be accessible, but contractor-side training records are vulnerable. Were the crew trained to respond to a nighttime sinking? Were they drilled on abandon-ship procedures? Were they told where the life jackets were stored? The answers live in training records that can disappear.
Survivor Witness Statements
The two crew members who swam to shore are the only eyewitnesses to the sinking. Their accounts of the sinking sequence — whether alarms sounded, how quickly water rose, whether hatches were accessible, whether the vessel listed or capsized, whether anyone called out — are irreplaceable causation evidence. Survivors in remote coastal communities may return to distant locations, relocate, or be influenced by employer communications in the aftermath. Formal recorded statements should be obtained promptly through qualified Chilean counsel, before memories fade and before employer representatives shape the narrative.
ROV Footage and Diver Documentation
Underwater documentation of the vessel’s condition at the seabed — captured by ROV and divers during the active recovery operation — is the most reliable pre-salvage evidence of the sinking mechanics. ROV footage from the recovery is being generated now and must be preserved before operational copies are overwritten or discarded. This footage shows the vessel as it came to rest, before salvage cables, lifting straps, and surface handling disturbed the scene.
Weather and Tidal Current Data
Salmones Austral reports “normal weather conditions.” Verifying or contradicting that characterization with independent meteorological and hydrographic data for the Reloncaví Estuary at the time of sinking is essential. Historical weather and tide data are archived but should be secured as authenticated records for any future litigation. If the weather was not normal — if there was unexpected wind, swell, or tidal current — the charterer’s public statement becomes an admission. If the weather was normal, the unseaworthiness theory strengthens, because the vessel sank without external cause.
What a Maritime Wrongful Death Case Is Worth
The value of a maritime wrongful death case depends entirely on the forum — which law governs, which court hears it, and which damage framework applies. We owe you the honest answer, not a number designed to close a deal.
Under Chilean Law
If this case proceeds in Chilean courts under Chilean civil law — which is the most likely scenario given the absence of an apparent U.S. nexus — the damage framework is materially different from U.S. tort law. Chilean law recognizes economic damages (lost financial support to dependents, lost future earnings, funeral and burial costs) and daño moral (moral damages for loss of companionship and emotional suffering). Awards are historically more conservative than U.S. non-economic damages. Punitive or exemplary damages are not a standard feature of Chilean civil law the way they exist in U.S. tort systems, though aggravated damages may be available in certain contexts. The realistic range under Chilean law, based on the case profile, is approximately $500,000 to $5,000,000 — but this is a framework, not a prediction. Every case turns on its facts, on the earnings of each crew member, on the number and age of dependents, and on the severity of the negligence proven.
If a U.S. Nexus Were Established
If discovery revealed a U.S.-citizen decedent, a U.S.-corporate parent, or a U.S.-domiciled insurer — any of which would open a U.S. forum — the valuation changes fundamentally. Under the Jones Act, full economic and non-economic damages plus potential punitive damages for gross negligence would be available. Under general maritime law unseaworthiness, compensatory damages without fault would be available. Under DOHSA (if applicable), pecuniary losses only. The realistic U.S. valuation per decedent, depending on earnings, dependents, and negligence severity, could range from $3 million to $15 million or more.
But a U.S. forum is not automatic. Any U.S. plaintiff firm considering involvement would need to evaluate jurisdictional thresholds, forum non conveniens challenges (the defense argument that the case belongs in Chile, not the United States), and the applicability of Chilean law versus U.S. maritime law through a conflicts-of-law analysis. This is not a case where a U.S. firm can simply file suit in Houston and proceed. It requires coordination with Chilean maritime counsel, careful jurisdictional analysis, and an honest assessment of where the case belongs.
Collectibility
A judgment is only worth what can be collected. Koñimo company, as a maintenance contractor, may have limited assets and modest insurance. Salmones Austral, as a significant salmon farming operation, likely has meaningful corporate resources. The collectibility of any award depends on identifying the right defendants, mapping the insurance tower, and pursuing the entities with the deepest pockets — which is often the charterer, not the vessel owner. This is why the charterer liability theory is not a legal luxury. It is the path to a recovery that actually pays for what was lost.
Past results depend on the facts of each case and do not guarantee future outcomes.
The Medicine of a Vessel Sinking: Cold Water, Dark Water, and the Survival Window
The Reloncaví Estuary is a fjord in southern Chile. The water is cold — cold enough to kill a swimmer within minutes, not hours. When the Koñimo 1 sank at 4:00 AM, the crew was asleep. Two men managed to swim 70 meters to shore. Six did not.
How Drowning Kills
Drowning is not what most people picture. There is no dramatic splashing, no screaming, no Hollywood struggle. The drowning process — from submersion to cardiac arrest — usually occurs in seconds to a few minutes. When water hits the airway, the larynx spasms shut involuntarily. The person cannot call out. Gas exchange stops. Oxygen levels in the blood drop. Within seconds, the brain begins to fail. Within four to ten minutes of anoxia, irreversible brain injury begins in the hippocampus, basal ganglia, and cerebral cortex — the regions that control memory, movement, and thought.
For a crew member sleeping below decks when the vessel sinks, the timeline is even more compressed. Waking to rising water in a dark cabin, disoriented, finding hatches blocked by water pressure or jammed by debris, in cold air and colder water — the survival window is measured in the time it takes to find an exit, not the time it takes to swim to shore. The two who survived were the ones who found a way out before the water and the cold took them.
Cold Water Immersion
The Reloncaví Estuary’s water temperature significantly reduces the survival window for crew immersed without proper emergency egress or flotation. Cold water kills in stages: cold shock (gasping reflex, potential cardiac arrest on immersion), cold incapacitation (loss of muscle control within minutes, inability to swim or grip), and hypothermia (core temperature drop over 30-60 minutes, though in very cold water, incapacitation kills before hypothermia sets in). Swimming 70 meters in cold water is not a minor feat — it is a race against cold incapacitation that two men won and six men lost.
What the Defense Exploits
In any maritime wrongful death case, the defense will argue alternative causes: pre-existing health conditions, alcohol or drug impairment, failure to wear flotation devices, crew error in responding to the emergency. The counter is the mechanism timeline: if the vessel sank because it was unseaworthy — because the hull failed, the bilge failed, the watertight compartments failed — then the crew’s inability to escape is a consequence of the unseaworthiness, not a separate cause. The vessel owner takes the crew as it finds them. A crew member who could not swim 70 meters in cold water because he was not a strong swimmer, because he was exhausted from a full day of maintenance work, because he was woken from a dead sleep by water rising around his bunk — that is not comparative fault. That is the foreseeable consequence of sleeping aboard an unseaworthy vessel.
The Insurance and Company Playbook: What They Will Try
Within days of a vessel sinking, the companies’ insurance machinery begins to move. Here is what they will try, and how each play is countered.
Play 1: The Sympathy Call With a Release
Someone from the company — or the company’s insurer, or a claims administrator — will contact the families with condolences and an offer of immediate financial assistance. The money may come with a release form attached, or the release may follow shortly after. The offer is designed to secure a signature before the family has spoken to a lawyer and before the investigation reveals what really happened. The counter: do not sign anything without independent legal review. A release signed in the first weeks after a sinking, while a family is in grief and the evidence is still being raised from the seabed, is the cheapest settlement the company will ever buy.
Play 2: “Permits Were Up to Date”
The charterer has already deployed this play publicly: the vessel “had all its permits up to date.” This is designed to frame the sinking as unforeseeable — a compliance-certified vessel that simply suffered a tragic accident. The counter: permits verify that paperwork was filed and inspections were passed at some prior date. They do not certify that the vessel was seaworthy on the night it sank. A vessel can pass inspection in January and develop a corroded through-hull fitting by June. The inspection record is a starting point, not a conclusion. The question is what the maintenance records show about the vessel’s condition in the days and weeks before the sinking — not what the permit file showed on its cover page.
Play 3: “Normal Weather Conditions”
By stating the weather was normal, the charterer is subtly building a narrative that the sinking was inexplicable — an act of God, a freak occurrence no one could have prevented. The counter: if the weather was normal, the vessel sank because of itself. Normal weather is not a defense to unseaworthiness. It is a confirmation of it. A seaworthy vessel does not sink at anchor in calm water. If the weather was not normal — if the company is mischaracterizing the conditions — independent meteorological data will contradict the statement, and the public characterization becomes an admission worth preserving.
Play 4: Employer Influence on Survivors
The two survivors are the only eyewitnesses. They may be employees of Koñimo company, or of a contractor, or of an entity with an interest in shaping their accounts. They may be contacted by employer representatives, offered assistance, or subtly steered toward a narrative that protects the company. The counter: survivor statements must be obtained promptly through qualified counsel, before employer communications shape the narrative. The survivors need medical evaluation, trauma support, and protected statement collection — not conversations with the people who sent them to sleep on a sinking boat.
Play 5: The Limitation of Liability Filing
The vessel owner may file a limitation of liability action within six months of receiving written notice of a claim, attempting to cap all liability at the post-accident value of the vessel — which for a sunk catamaran workboat may be near zero. The counter: the limitation shield only works if the owner had no “privity or knowledge” of the dangerous condition. Investigation must focus on what the owner knew and when — maintenance records, prior complaints, inspection findings, crew reports. An owner who knew about hull defects, failed bilge systems, or prior water ingress incidents cannot limit liability. The six-month deadline also means the family’s written claim should be structured to trigger the clock on the family’s terms, not the company’s.
How a Vessel-Sinking Case Is Actually Built
Here is how a maritime wrongful death case is built, from the first call to the final number — not in abstractions, but in the steps that actually happen.
Week One. The preservation letter goes out — to Koñimo company, to Salmones Austral, to any salvage operator, to any insurance carrier — ordering them to freeze the hull, the electronic data, the maintenance records, the crew files, the ROV footage, and the weather data. The survivors are identified and their statements are taken through qualified Chilean counsel. The corporate structure is mapped: who owns the vessel, who chartered it, who insured it, who managed it. A jurisdictional analysis begins: is there a U.S. nexus? A U.S.-citizen crew member? A U.S. corporate parent? A U.S. insurer? This analysis determines whether the case stays in Chile or can reach a U.S. forum.
Weeks Two Through Four. The hull is forensically examined by a naval architect specializing in catamaran stability and watertight integrity. The breach location is identified. The corrosion pattern is documented. The hull-to-deck joints are examined. The bilge system is tested. The watertight compartment integrity is assessed. Every finding is photographed, measured, and preserved before salvage handling degrades the evidence. Electronic data is extracted from any recovered VDR or onboard systems — before saltwater corrosion destroys what remains.
Months Two Through Six. The maintenance and inspection records are demanded in discovery. The crew certification and training records are obtained. The weather and tidal data is secured as authenticated records. The corporate structure is traced through filings and registries. The insurance tower is mapped — primary, excess, umbrella, self-insured retention. Expert witnesses are retained: a marine forensic investigator, a naval architect, an aquaculture-industry safety expert familiar with Chilean regulatory standards.
Months Six Through Twelve. Depositions are taken. The vessel owner’s safety director explains the company’s choices under oath. The charterer’s operations manager explains why the crew was aboard the vessel overnight. The survivors describe what they heard, felt, and saw. The maintenance contractor explains the last inspection. Every witness is measured against the records — and the gaps between testimony and documents are where the case is won.
The Number. The damages are built by a life-care planner and a forensic economist. Lost financial support to dependents. Lost future earnings. Funeral and burial costs. Under Chilean law, daño moral — the moral damage of loss of companionship. Under U.S. law, if a nexus exists, pain and suffering, lost earning capacity, and potential punitive damages for gross negligence. The number at the end is built from all of it — the hull evidence, the records, the depositions, the medicine, the lifetime arithmetic — and it is the number the company should have calculated before it sent eight men to sleep on a vessel that could not stay afloat.
The First 72 Hours: What Families Must Do Now
If your family has lost someone in a vessel sinking — whether this one or another — the hours and days that follow are when the case is either preserved or lost. Here is what must happen.
Do not sign anything. No release, no settlement, no acknowledgment, no statement — nothing. If a company representative, an insurance adjuster, or anyone offering money asks you to sign a document, the answer is: I need to speak with a lawyer first. That sentence has saved more families from giving away their rights than any other sentence in the English language. If you speak Spanish, that sentence is: Necesito hablar con un abogado primero.
Do not give a recorded statement. Someone will call — friendly, sympathetic, concerned — and ask you to “just tell us what happened” on a recording. That recording is built to be used against your family, not to help you. Decline politely and refer all communications to counsel.
Preserve everything you have. Any photographs, messages, emails, or documents from your loved one — about the vessel, the work, the crew, the conditions. Do not delete anything. Do not post on social media about the sinking. Do not discuss the case with anyone except a lawyer.
Get the survivors’ accounts protected. If you know or are related to one of the survivors, understand that their account of the sinking is the most valuable evidence in the case — and the most vulnerable to influence. Their statement should be taken formally, through qualified counsel, as soon as possible.
Contact a maritime lawyer immediately. Not next month. Not after the investigation concludes. Not after the funeral. The evidence on the hull degrades with each day post-salvage. The electronic data may be unreadable within weeks. The survivors’ memories are most accurate in the first days. The preservation letter that freezes the records has to go out now. If you are in the United States and your loved one was a crew member on a vessel that sank — whether in Chilean waters, the Gulf of Mexico, or anywhere else — call us at 1-888-ATTY-911. The call is free. The consultation is free. And we do not get paid unless we win your case.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can our family sue if the sinking happened in Chile?
Yes — but the question is where, and under what law. This sinking occurred in Chilean territorial waters, so Chilean maritime law and the Chilean civil code govern the underlying claims. A Chilean court is the most likely forum. However, if a U.S. connection exists — a U.S.-citizen crew member, a U.S. corporate parent, a U.S.-domiciled insurer — U.S. maritime law may provide an alternative forum with a far more favorable damage framework. Identifying whether that nexus exists is one of the first tasks, and it requires a jurisdictional analysis by counsel familiar with both systems. Any U.S. firm considering involvement would coordinate with Chilean maritime counsel as lead, with the U.S. firm’s role limited to jurisdictional analysis, expert coordination, and claims against U.S.-connected entities.
What does “unseaworthiness” mean, and why does it matter?
Unseaworthiness is a maritime law doctrine that requires a vessel to be reasonably fit for its intended use — including safe accommodation for crew sleeping aboard. It is an absolute, non-delegable warranty owed by the vessel owner to the crew. The owner is liable even if they were not personally negligent. A catamaran that sinks at anchor in calm weather is a prima facie unseaworthiness case: something about the vessel — its hull, its bulkheads, its bilge system, its freeboard — was not fit to keep the crew alive. The owner must answer for that, regardless of fault.
The company said the vessel “had all its permits up to date.” Does that protect them?
No. Permits and certifications verify that paperwork was filed and inspections were passed at some prior date. They do not certify that the vessel was seaworthy on the night it sank. A vessel can have every permit current and still develop a corroded through-hull fitting, a failed bilge pump, a cracked hull-to-deck joint, or an obstructed emergency escape route. “Permits up to date” is a compliance statement. Seaworthiness is a condition. The gap between them is where the case lives.
How long do we have to file a claim?
The deadline to file depends entirely on the governing law. Under Chilean law, the limitation period is set by Chilean civil and labor code provisions — confirm the current deadline with Chilean maritime counsel, as we cannot state a specific Chilean statute of limitations number without verification. Under U.S. maritime law, if a Jones Act claim were available, the deadline is three years from the date of injury or death (45 U.S.C. § 56, borrowed from the Federal Employers’ Liability Act). Under DOHSA, the deadline is three years from the date of death. Under general maritime law, courts often apply a three-year limitation by analogy. But the deadline is only half the story — the evidence dies faster than the deadline. The hull degrades, the electronic data corrupts, the survivors’ memories fade. Acting early is about preserving proof, not just preserving rights.
The company offered us money. Should we take it?
Not without independent legal review. Early offers from vessel owners and charterers are designed to secure releases before the investigation reveals what really happened. The money offered in the first weeks is almost always a fraction of what the case is worth once the hull evidence, the maintenance records, and the witness statements are assembled. A release signed in grief is the cheapest settlement the company will ever buy. Talk to a lawyer first. The consultation is free.
What if our loved one was a contractor, not a direct employee?
The contractor structure is the central liability question in this case. Koñimo company owned and operated the vessel. Salmones Austral hired the vessel and crew for its aquaculture operations. Under maritime charterer liability principles, the entity that controls the work assignment and places crew aboard a vessel may share responsibility for conditions it knew or should have known existed. If Salmones Austral failed to vet Koñimo’s safety record, or if it knew about prior incidents and retained the contractor anyway, it faces a negligent hiring/retention theory. The contractor structure is designed to shield the charterer — but the law has tools to pierce it.
Is there insurance to cover a vessel sinking with multiple deaths?
There is always insurance — the question is how much, in what order, and who controls it. The vessel owner (Koñimo) likely carries marine liability coverage, but as a maintenance contractor, the limits may be modest. The charterer (Salmones Austral) likely carries broader commercial coverage as a significant salmon farming operation. If a U.S. nexus existed, the Jones Act would require the employer to carry workers’ compensation equivalent coverage. The coverage tower — primary, excess, umbrella, self-insured retention — must be mapped through discovery. The company’s first offer will come from the lowest layer of the thinnest policy. Finding every layer is part of the work.
Can we sue in the United States if the sinking was in Chile?
Only if a U.S. jurisdictional basis exists. That basis could be a U.S.-citizen crew member, a U.S.-flagged vessel, a U.S. corporate parent or subsidiary, a U.S.-domiciled insurer, or another connection giving a U.S. court jurisdiction. Even with jurisdiction, the defense will raise forum non conveniens — the argument that the case belongs in Chile, not the United States, because the witnesses, the evidence, and the incident are all there. The analysis is complex and fact-specific. If you believe a U.S. connection exists, contact a U.S. maritime attorney immediately to evaluate the jurisdictional threshold. We can make that evaluation. The call is free.
Why This Firm
We are Attorney911 — The Manginello Law Firm, PLLC. We are a trial firm that handles maritime wrongful death and catastrophic injury cases, and we have been doing this work for more than two decades. We are writing to you as the firm we are, not the firm we wish we were.
Ralph Manginello is our Managing Partner, licensed in Texas since November 6, 1998 — 27+ years of trial practice, including in federal court. He is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He went to law school at South Texas College of Law Houston after studying journalism and public relations at the University of Texas at Austin. Before he was a lawyer, he was a journalist — which means he was trained to find the facts, and that training never left. He is a member of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association and the Houston Bar Association. When Ralph takes a case, the other side knows they are in a fight with someone who hates losing. You can read more about Ralph here.
Lupe Peña is our associate attorney, licensed in Texas since December 6, 2012 — 13+ years of practice, also admitted to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Lupe spent his early career inside a national insurance-defense firm — the rooms where adjusters and their software decide how to deny, delay, and devalue claims from people exactly like the families reading this page. He knows how the machine works from the inside: how reserves are set in the first 48 hours, how recorded statements are engineered, how valuation software discounts pain it cannot see. Now he sits on your side of the table. Lupe is fluent in Spanish and conducts full client consultations in Spanish without an interpreter. If your family’s loss touches the Spanish-speaking world — as this one does — that matters. You can read more about Lupe here.
We handle maritime and offshore injury cases. We handle wrongful death claims. We handle workplace accident cases. And we handle them on contingency: 33.33% before trial, 40% if the case goes to trial. We do not get paid unless we win your case. The first call costs nothing. The consultation is free. And the call is answered 24 hours a day, 7 days a week — by our live staff, not an answering service.
This page is legal information, not legal advice. We are not your lawyers unless and until we sign a representation agreement. We are not counsel on the Koñimo 1 sinking, and nothing on this page should be read as a claim that we are. What we are is a firm that knows maritime wrongful death law, that knows how the insurance machine works from the inside, and that knows what the first 72 hours require — because the evidence that proves your case is dying while you read this.
If your family lost someone in a vessel sinking — whether this one or another — call us at 1-888-ATTY-911 (1-888-288-9911). We offer a free consultation. There is no fee unless we win. Hablamos Español. Lupe conducts full consultations in Spanish. Your family does not have to navigate this in a language that is not yours.
The vessel that sank was supposed to keep them safe. It did not. The law gives you the right to ask why — and to hold the people who sent them to sleep on that boat accountable for what happened in the dark. Call us. The evidence is waiting, and it will not wait forever.
Past results depend on the facts of each case and do not guarantee future outcomes. This page is legal information, not legal advice. Contacting the firm is free and confidential.